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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper presents the methodological and
statistical framework for macro-prudential
analysis of the EU banking sector health
conducted by the Banking Supervision
Committee (BSC) of the European System of
Central Banks (ESCB). This analysis is a
central component of a broader financial
stability monitoring carried out by the ECB in
co-operation with national central banks and
supervisory authorities represented in the
ESCB and with the support of the ESCB
Statistics Committee (STC). The macro-
prudential analysis has been conducted since
2000 on a regular basis.1
Much of the discussion on macro-prudential
analysis has been based on the lessons from the
“traditional” banking crises of the 1980s and
1990s (e.g. in the Nordic countries, United
States, Asia and Latin America). While the
stylised patterns of the “lending – asset price
booms” and resulting credit risks reasonably
describe many of these crises, there is no
guarantee that future crises will follow a similar
pattern. First, the rapid increase in banks’
financial market activities has heightened their
exposure to market risks and earnings volatility.
Second, the greater links between banks and
non-bank financial institutions may have
increased the likelihood that shocks emanating
from non-banks become systemic and spread to
banks. Third, owing to changes in banks funding
and investment patterns, liquidity conditions in
money and other financial markets and
contagion risks may play an increasingly
relevant role, rather than traditional liquidity
crises due to runs by retail depositors (who are
protected through deposit insurance).
In order to capture and monitor all relevant
risks, both the traditional ones as well as those
induced by the above (and other) structural
changes, the framework for macro-prudential
analysis needs to have a wide scope and be
dynamic by nature. The framework adopted in
the ESCB has three main building blocks,
which draw on a large number of macro-
prudential indicators (MPIs). The first block –
assessment of the current financial conditions
in the banking sector – is largely backward-
looking. It is a starting point for the analysis of
the ability of the banking sector to withstand
possible disturbances. A number of MPIs
measure current efficiency, profitability, capital
adequacy, asset quality, provisioning and
reserves of liquid assets and provide the means
to assess the size of banks’ buffers available to
absorb losses or liquidity outflows.
The second building block is an analysis of
actual and/or potential sources of risk to
which banks are exposed and identification of
the size of these exposures. This analysis is a
combination of a backward-looking assessment
of exposures in banks books and a forward-
looking assessment of likelihood of different
scenarios where these exposures could result in
losses to banks. These risks can be common
to all (or many) banks. They may stem
from external macroeconomic developments
affecting the conditions of banks’ borrower
sectors and general financial market
conditions. They can also be endogenous to the
banking sector (e.g. over-extension of credit,
excessive market risk taking, inadequate
risk management, etc.). Sources of risk
and vulnerability can also be induced by
interlinkages between individual institutions
via contagion, e.g. liquidity problems or failures
of individual institutions spreading from bank to
bank. As potential adverse developments can
be induced by unforeseen sources and/or be
of varying intensity, considering a range of
scenarios is appropriate. In particular, scenarios
of “low-probability but high negative impact”
should also be included. Central for this
scenario analysis is to allow for the possible
correlation between the sources of risks and
indicators of bank borrowers’ financial
condition (indebtedness, payment arrears,
collateral valuations, bankruptcies, market-
based default risk measures).
1 The BSC is the ESCB forum of cooperation among national
central banks, supervisory authorities and the ECB. The STC
provides the equivalent ESCB forum for central bank
statisticians.5
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The final part of the analysis deals with the
resilience of banks vis-à-vis the different
sources of risk and vulnerability. The analysis
of the impact of the identified risks on banks’
financial condition is the ultimate objective of
the macro-prudential analysis. The analysis
focuses on systemic consequences and is
concerned with the risk of disturbances
spreading across the EU/euro area banking
sectors. The analytical framework increasingly
relies on forward looking default risk
indicators devised from market prices on
banks’ securities. These are constructed to
reflect the failure risk in the banking sector,
induced by a combination of relevant
underlying risks. Aggregation of these
indicators and their dispersion can provide
measures of systemic risk.
Since market indicators reflect the most likely
outcome in the near future as perceived by
market participants, the assessment of the
sensitivity of banks’ operations to severe
shocks with lower probability of realisation
will have to be conducted separately. To this
end, stress-testing tools are being developed, in
conjunction with the progressive evolution in
this field in national central banks. These
models also help understand the transmission
channels of the shocks to the banking sector
financial condition.
The analytical framework adopted in the
ESCB has been reflected in the statistical
production of MPIs. Given the nature of the
financial stability tasks of the ESCB, the
statistical requirements needed for the
compilation of MPIs have been addressed
through co-operation between the BSC and
STC and voluntary arrangements. Further
work is being undertaken in order to
improve data quality aspects of the MPIs
(concerning coverage, timeliness, reliability,
comparability, accessibility, etc.).
The data sources of MPIs are rather diversified,
but can be broadly grouped into three main
categories: national supervisory data,
harmonised macroeconomic statistics, and
market data. It is important to note that
international harmonisation and statistical
consistency is much easier to achieve in
macroeconomic statistics. Conversely, the
aggregation of micro-prudential data, which
were originally designed to monitor the
business of individual institutions, is often
difficult. Moreover, the construction of
meaningful time series is only possible if
complemented by detailed metadata which
explain the limitations (in terms of
international comparison, etc.) of the data set.
While suffering from some shortcomings as
regards consistency, aggregate micro-
prudential data are well suited for macro-
prudential analysis as they have a risk
perspective and they are compiled on a
consolidated basis, thus permitting the analysis
of risks taken by all financial entities belonging
to the same banking group. This is contrary to
monetary and other macroeconomic statistics,
which are unconsolidated, i.e. consist of the
aggregation of individual institutional entities’
data which are reported separately even if they
belong to the same banking group. Moreover,
macroeconomic statistics separate the accounts
of the financial sectors (monetary financial
institutions, other financial intermediaries,
financial auxiliaries, insurance corporations
and pension funds), while aggregate micro-
prudential data focus on the financial sector as
a whole, although within it the banking sector
plays a key role.
In an ideal setting, for the purpose of macro-
prudential analysis national supervisory data
and harmonised macroeconomic statistics
should be better integrated in two dimensions:
1) applying statistical concepts and
classifications when the micro-prudential
data are aggregated and 2) enhancing
macroeconomic statistics with additional
breakdowns and consolidation concepts for
macro-prudential analysis. This objective can
only be achieved in the long-term and
requires extensive work in enhancing the
coherence of the definitions of the
basic prudential aggregates, the consistency,6
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coverage and homogeneity of the reporting
population and the application of a full cross-
sector consolidation approach.
Analytical tools and concepts for macro-
prudential analysis are being developed also by
many national central banks and international
organisations, such as the IMF framework of
Financial Soundness Indicators. Whereas there
are many common features between the
approaches developed by these institutions,
differences also exist. As regards the
comparison with the framework developed
by national central banks in the EU and the
ESCB, the approaches complement each other
as the national central banks prepare an
analysis on their national financial systems
while the ESCB framework covers the whole
euro area/EU financial system.7
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The objective of this paper is to motivate and
describe the framework for macro-prudential
analysis of EU banking sector stability adopted
within the ESCB. The paper also includes a
review of the associated statistical issues
related to the ongoing development of an
improved set of macro-prudential indicators
(MPIs) for the purpose of this analysis.
The analysis of the banking sector is a central
component of a broader financial stability
monitoring which covers also non-bank
financial institutions, major financial markets
and market infrastructures. While the stability
of the banking sector continues to be key to
financial stability as a whole, wider analysis is
essential to cover increasing potential risks to
financial stability stemming from non-bank
financial institutions, financial markets and
payment and settlement systems and other
central parts of the infrastructure.
The series of costly banking crises in 1980s and
1990s gave birth to the development of macro-
prudential analysis. Ex ante assessment of the
resilience of financial institutions to withstand
potential major disturbances and adverse
developments stemming from external
macroeconomic, financial market, or
endogenous financial sector developments
became key to preventing new crisis.
Macro-prudential analysis is distinct from
micro-prudential supervision, which focuses
on the financial condition of individual
institutions, their risks and risk management.
Macro-prudential analysis assesses the
banking and financial system as a whole and
covers the threats to financial stability
stemming from common shocks affecting all
(or a large part of) institutions or contagion of
individual problems to the rest of the system.
Macro-prudential analysis complements the
work of micro-prudential supervisors, as the
risk of correlated failures, or the economic or
financial market implications of problems of
financial institutions are not directly covered
under the (micro-) prudential perspective. The
ultimate policy objective can also be different
as prudential supervision can focus extensively
on investor and depositor protection, while the
macro-prudential perspective is more clearly
concerned with avoiding loss of output (GPD).2
However, macro-prudential analysis is
concerned with the implications of distress in
the financial system, not only necessarily
focusing on the emergence of major financial
and economic crises.
Formally, the role of the ECB/ESCB in
financial stability is enshrined in the
Maastricht Treaty. According to Article
105(5), one of the tasks of the ESCB is “to
contribute to the smooth conduct of policies
pursued by the competent authorities relating
to the prudential supervision of credit
institutions and the stability of the financial
system”. The main objective of the Eurosystem,
notably maintaining price stability represents
per se a major contribution to financial
stability. However, historical evidence shows
that financial instability can also occur under
stable prices and the real economic costs of
such episodes can be very large (see e.g. Padoa-
Schioppa, 2002). Hence, there is a need to pay
attention to financial stability on its own right
beyond the maintenance of price stability.
The monitoring and analysis of financial
stability conditions from a euro area and EU-
wide perspective is considered the main
contribution of the ECB and the ESCB to the
maintenance of financial stability within the
EU. Such an area-wide perspective is more and
more important due to the progressing
integration of the financial sector in the EU.3
Common shocks are increasingly the source of
financial stability concerns in an economically
2 See Borio (2003) for a more complete discussion of the
differences between the macro- and micro-prudential
perspectives. See also Crockett (1998) for the first clear
motivation of independent macro-prudential analysis.
3 See three ECB Occasional Papers characterising the progress
in financial integration in the euro area and EU: Baele et al.
(2004), Cabral et al. (2002) and Santillán et al. (2000), and
Dierick and Vesala (2004). These studies contain ample
references to studies by official bodies (e.g. the European
Commission) and by academic researchers.8
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and financially integrated area and the common
wholesale financial markets in euro can
propagate financial disturbances across
borders more easily than before. Given their
supranational mandate the ECB and the ESCB
have a natural role in conducting EU/euro-
area-wide financial stability analysis on a
regular basis.
Macro-prudential analysis is an integral part of
general financial stability analysis.4
Significant experience in the analysis of the
stability of the banking sector has been already
reached through the collaboration between the
ECB and the national competent authorities
within the Banking Supervision Committee
(BSC). Regular analyses aiming at identifying
sources of vulnerabilities in the euro area and
EU banking sector and providing an overall
assessment of its stability have been conducted
since 2000. This analysis is supported by the
use of macro-prudential indicators (MPIs). The
findings of the macro-prudential analysis are
discussed by the decision-making bodies of the
ESCB, and are distributed to relevant EU
bodies of policy makers (foremost the
Economic and Financial Committee). Since
February 2003, three annual banking sector
stability reports have been published.5
The statistical requirements for the analysis of
the EU banking sector have been addressed to
date by using a mix of national supervisory
data, harmonised money and banking statistics
and market data sources. Given the growing
importance of the macro-prudential analysis,
the related statistical requirements are being
further improved, in particular the data quality
aspects. Data need to be available in a timely
manner and should offer the appropriate time-
series perspective. Moreover, the data
coverage should be harmonised in order to
ensure cross-country comparisons. This paper
also describes how these statistical issues have
been addressed in the ECB.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2
reviews lessons from past banking crises for
developing macro-prudential analysis and
describes the main changes taking place in the
risk profile of EU banks due to structural
developments in the economy, financial
markets and banks’ business activities. Section
3 summarises the overall analytical framework
adopted for the ESCB macro-prudential
analysis. Sections 4 – 6 describe in more detail
the three core elements of the framework: (i)
assessment of the current financial conditions
in the banking sector, (ii) identification of
major actual and potential sources of risk and
vulnerability to banking stability, and (iii)
forward-looking analysis of the ability of the
banking sector to withstand possible risk
realisations. Sections 7 and 8 turn to key
statistical issues concerning, respectively, the
compilation of the MPIs and the integration of
information from different data sources.
Finally, Section 9 compares the ECB approach
with similar initiatives (in particular the IMF
Financial Soundness Indicators’ (FSI) project).
2 CHANGES IN EU BANKS’ RISK PROFILE
When developing the analytical framework and
indicators for macro-prudential analysis of the
banking sector, the main objective is to
sufficiently cover all major sources of risk.
This requires due attention to the structural
changes in the economy, financial markets, and
banks’ business activities as these changes
influence banks’ risk profiles.
Macro-prudential analysis of the banking
sector has been much guided by the lessons of
the banking crises experienced in the 1980s and
1990s. While the experience of these crises
continues to provide useful insights, new
potential sources of risk must also be
appreciated. This Section reviews first the
lessons from the past crises, turning then to
relevant changes that have taken place more
recently.
4 The ECB published its first Financial Stability Review in
December 2004. See ECB (2004c).
5 See ECB (2003a), (2003b) and (2004b).9
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risk profile 2.1 LESSONS FROM BANKING CRISES IN THE
1980S AND 1990S
The banking crises in Latin America and the
crisis of US Savings&Loans institutions in the
1980s, the three Nordic banking crises of
Finland, Norway and Sweden in the early
1990s, and the several emerging and
developing country crises later in the 1990s
(e.g. Brazil – 1994, Thailand, Korea and
Philippines – 1997-1998), could be labelled as
traditional banking crises.6 In Latin America,
the banking crises resulted from the rapid
accumulation of credit by US banks. The US
Savings&Loans crises had its origins in the
outdated strategies and risk management that
could not keep the pace with deregulation of
US interest rate markets in 1970’s which
resulted in highly volatile nominal interest
rates.7 The Nordic banking crises were a
consequence of very rapid credit expansion
made possible by the deregulation of foreign
capital inflows and restrictions on banks’
assets, which dangerously propped up asset
prices and the indebtedness of the domestic
non-financial sectors of the economy. The
emerging market crises were also driven by the
over-extension of credit, but they mainly took
place (like in Finland) in foreign currencies,
which rendered banks’ unhedged clients highly
vulnerable to the eventual depreciation of the
domestic currency.
The costs associated with the crises were
very large. Both the direct resolution costs of
crises to governments and the broader costs to
welfare of the economy due to deficient
allocation of resources and lack of funding
represented large losses in output. Empirical
studies estimate average output losses reaching
15-20% of annual GDP for developing
countries that experienced banking crises.8
Total losses reached 40-50% in Chile (1976)
and Argentina (1980-82). Costs of a banking
crisis were generally higher in case of a
simultaneous currency crisis.
The “traditional” crises followed a fairly
similar, although not always predictable
pattern.9  Deregulation of the banking sector
and removal of capital controls led to a lending
boom, which resulted in high economic growth
due to very high investment, very low risk
premia and inflation in asset prices (stock and
real estate prices). In the new liberalised
environment, the risk management techniques
of banks and the supervisory practices also
proved inadequate. Favourable economic and
asset price developments created and masked
over-investment in some sectors in a market
sentiment of “euphoria”, which created
imbalances and distortions. At some point,
often triggered by some relatively benign
event, the process went into reverse and the
ensuing contraction resulted in widespread
instability in the banking sector, as well as the
macro-economy. In sum, financial instability
was mainly due to credit risk and affected
banks rather than non-bank financial
institutions or financial markets.
Indeed, following Fisher’s (1932, 1933)
analysis of the Great Depression, many authors
have suggested that the basic reason for the
connection between asset price cycles and
banking problems is the over-expansion of
bank credit, fuelling the build-up of the asset
prices and increasing banks’ credit risks.10
There is a self-sustaining process of increased
collateral values, which enhances clients’
ability to accumulate debt and the increasing
value of bank capital enhances banks’ ability to
extend credit. Once the peak of the cycle is
6 See, for example, Goodhart et al. (1998), Drees and
Parsabasioglu (1998) (Nordic crises), and White (1991) (US
S&L crisis).
7 When S&L institutions tried to compete with money market
funds by offering interest rates in line with or even above
market rates, an unsustainable gap opened up between the cost
of their funding liabilities (short-term interest rates) and the
income generated by their assets (long-term, fixed-rate
mortgage repayments) that resulted in solvency problems in
many of these institutions.
8 See, for example, Hoggarth and Saporta (2001), who measure
costs in terms of output foregone, and the references therein.
9 See, in addition to the references quoted above, e.g. Kaminsky
and Reinhart (1996), Herring and Wachter (1999), Borio and
Lowe (2002), Borio (2003), and Padoa-Schioppa (2002).
Evans et al. (2000) reviews the evidence of the patterns
leading up to the Mexican and Asian crises (their Section III).
10 See e.g. Minsky (1977, 1991), Kindleberger (1978),
Eichengreen and Portes (1987) and Allen and Gale (1998).10
ECB
Occasional Paper No. 26
April 2005
being approached, the asset prices become
increasingly disconnected from their
“fundamental values” and vulnerable to
exogenous shocks. The difficulties
experienced by borrowers are transmitted to
banks. Banks’ asset quality and capital
adequacy problems may lead to tightening
lending standards and credit rationing, thereby
deepening customers’ difficulties further. In
the most severe case, confidence problems with
respect to the soundness of banks leads to runs
on bank deposits (a “real financial crisis” in the
terminology of Schwartz 1986).
Empirical evidence in favour of the causal links
in this theory is somewhat mixed. However, the
tests about the direction of causality and the
origins of instability do not cast doubt on the
main point, i.e. the link between a sharp
reversal of prices in the stock or real estate
markets and the spreading of instability in the
banking sector.
In the light of the experiences from the past
crises and the above-quoted literature, for
instance, Borio and Lowe (2002) propose to use
indicators, which may signal the build-up of
financial imbalances in an economy. Their
results suggest that the ratio of private sector
credit to GDP, equity prices and real effective
exchange rates should be leading candidates as
indicators of financial instability. Further, they
suggest that the use of cumulative deviations
from trend provide the best signals of
imbalances, which may be building up.11
2.2 MAIN STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN THE EU
BANKING SECTOR
While the above noted stylised patterns
reasonably describe many crises of the 1980s
and 1990s, there is no guarantee that future
crises will follow a similar pattern (see Padoa-
Schioppa, 2002). More specifically, these
crises took place when, first, financial markets
were less developed. Second, there was strong
separation between the three main categories of
financial intermediaries (banks, insurance
companies and securities houses or broker-
dealers), including the products they offered
and the risks they incurred. Third, national
financial systems tended to be insulated from
one another as e.g. the European financial
integration was yet to progress significantly.
The following three Sections will discuss how
these characterising factors have tended to fade
away, having fundamental implications for
banks’ risk profile and banking sector stability.
2.2.1 INCREASED FINANCIAL MARKET
ACTIVITIES OF BANKS
In Europe, as well as elsewhere, financial
markets have widened and deepened
substantially over the past few years. ECB data
show that the shift towards securities and away
from bank deposits has been substantial in the
euro area. The share of deposits in total
household sector financial assets declined from
over 40% to around 30% between 1995 and
2002 in favour of direct and indirect (though
collective investment schemes) investments in
securities. The share of all securities
investments (including pension funds) rose
from 55% to 65%, despite the slowdown due to
the adverse equity market developments in
2001 and 2002, in particular the bursting of the
IT-sector equity bubble. The fastest growing
investment type has been pension funds and
especially mutual funds, which doubled their
share from 1995 to 2002.12
As the demand for securities has increased, the
financing of firms has moved towards the use of
capital market instruments. The introduction of
the euro has also given a major impetus to the
growth and integration of capital markets.13
The share of bank loans in the euro area non-
11 Borio and Lowe (2002) test the properties of these indicators
in a sample of 34 countries during 1960 to 1999. The sample
spans 40 crises in 27 countries. Using combinations of the
three variables, the authors are able to predict that a crisis will
take place with up to 75 percent accuracy, although the timing
of the crises appears to be more elusive.
12 See, for instance, Rajan and Zingales (2003) for a description
and discussion of the underlying forces driving the European
financial system towards a more market-oriented one. Allen
and Santomero (2001) describe the earlier process of the
decline of the traditional banking businesses in the United
States.
13 See, for instance, Baele et al. (2004) and Cabral et al. (2002).11
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risk profile financial firms’ total liabilities decreased
slightly from 35% to 33% between 1995 and
2002, while the share of equity increased from
44% to close to 50% and that of corporate
bonds from 3% to 5%. Despite fast growth,
corporate bond markets are still quite small in
the euro area and the importance of bank loans
remains much higher than in the market-based
United States.
For banks, these tendencies imply growing
demand for services in the areas of investment
banking (securities underwriting, loan
syndication, advice), securities trading and
market making, and asset management, while
demand growth for traditional loan (on the
corporate side) and deposit products becomes
more subdued (i.e. disintermediation).
Universal European banks are major
underwriters of securities and market
intermediaries in Europe, with a market share of
roughly 50-60% in the underwriting of equity
and bond issues in the euro area, competing
against large US investment banks.14 European
banks are also the major managers of collective
investment schemes with a market share of over
80% in many countries.
In terms of banks’ income structure,
disintermediation reduces the share of net
interest income from lending-deposit taking
activities in favour of fee income from
securities activities. From 1994 to 2000, the
share of net interest income to total income in
EU15 banks reduced from approximately 70%
to 55% (see Chart 1). For the largest banks
active in the securities field, this shift has gone
much further: the share of non-interest income
amounted to 70% of total consolidated income;
investment banking alone accounted for over
50% of total consolidated profits in some cases.
The trend turned around in 2001-2002. Banks’
financial market activities were affected by the
unfavourable market conditions, which
reduced households’ appetite to invest in
securities as well as firms’ mergers and
acquisitions and issuance activity. When
income from financial market sources
decreased, banks started to pay more attention
to reviving their traditional income sources.
Owing to the cyclical nature of these
developments, the growth in non-interest
income is expected to continue with pick-up in
the pace of the economic growth. Further
growth in securities markets is likely to be
stimulated by increased disposable income and
wealth, a greater propensity to invest in
securities, and the development of collective
investment and supplementary pension
schemes (see e.g. Rajan and Zingales, 2003). In
2003, EU banks’ non-interest income already
started to recover with improved financial
market conditions and signs of pick-up in
economic activity.
2.2.2 INCREASED LINKS OF BANKS WITH
NON-BANKS
EU banks’ expansion into securities activities
has mostly taken place via “organic” growth
through expanding the parent’s or subsidiaries’
activities.15 However, mergers and acquisitions
have played an increasingly important role in
order to take advantage of the developing and
14 See Cabral et al. (2002) and Dierick and Vesala (2004).
15 In the EU legal framework, universal banking groups can
organise their securities activities either directly or through
specialised subsidiaries.
Chart 1 EU banks’ income composition
(percentages of total income)
net interest income
commissions 
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Source: Banking Supervision Committee.12
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integrating securities markets and to cross-sell
different products through wide branch
networks. Banking groups have also
progressively expanded into insurance
activities, especially savings-like life and
pension products, though mergers and
acquisitions, or de novo establishment of
insurance businesses to develop
“bankassurance groups” (or financial
conglomerates) (see Dierick, 2004). Between
1994 and 2003 roughly 25% of all mergers and
acquisitions by EU banks were directed to the
insurance industry, while the share is notably
larger (37%) of cross-border deals (see Chart
2). There was a particularly large increase in
cross-sector mergers and acquisitions after the
launch of the euro. However, overall the major
part of these deals has remained domestic.16
Another factor causing the blurring of the
distinction between banks and non-bank
financial institutions, has been very rapid
growth in complex financial instruments,
designed to unbundle, trade, and transfer risks.
Although the statistics available are somewhat
unsystematic, it can be said that the global
markets for complex instruments – which for a
considerable part consist of OTC derivatives –
have doubled in size several times in ten years
or so according to the BIS derivative market
statistics. Whereas these instruments
originally developed in the market risk area,
they have been progressively extended into the
field of credit risk as well. The markets for
novel credit risk transfer (CRT) instruments
(credit derivatives and structured products
such as CDOs) are growing very fast. The
markets for traditional securitisations (such as
mortgage-backed securities) are also growing
rapidly in Europe (see ECB, 2004a).  The
growth is expected to remain strong in the
future.
Previously, banks were the main holders of
credit risk and their ability to diversify their
portfolio was dependent on their customer
base. With CRT, banks are able to hedge or
shed credit risks and diversify their portfolios
by investing in credits that would not be
otherwise available to them. On the other hand,
insurance companies and securities firms have
the opportunity to increasingly invest in credit
risk. Even though CRT is still relatively limited
overall, there are some European banks that are
already heavily involved either as protection
seller, buyers or intermediaries in CRT markets
(see ECB, 2004a). Also increasingly other
financial institutions, in particular insurance
companies and hedge funds, are involved.
2.2.3 PROGRESS IN THE INTEGRATION OF EU
BANKING SECTORS
There is ample evidence that substantial
integration has been achieved in the euro area
wholesale markets. Integration has also taken
place in securities market activities. In
contrast, retail financial activities have
remained strongly segmented.17
EU banks have diversified their activities
geographically in euro area via cross-border
provision of services, but to a different degree
depending on the activity, reflecting the
differences in the level of integration. Euro
area banks’ cross-border interbank loans
16 European “bankassurance” groups have to organise their
insurance activities in separate subsidiaries according to the
EU legal framework.
17 See the references quoted in the Introduction.
Chart 2 Total volume and number of
bankassurance mergers and acquisitions
Source: Thomson Financial (SDC Platinum).
1) Figures for the first half of 2004.
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risk profile increased from 20% in 1998 to 25% in 2003 of
total holdings (see Chart 3). Cross-border
securities issued by non-banks and held by euro
area banks increased from 20% to 45%. In
contrast, cross-border lending to non-banks
remained low, less than 5% of total holdings.
Another, and a more comprehensive way to
analyse the importance of banks’ foreign
operations is the share of foreign assets in total
consolidated assets. This share (total foreign
commercial presence) has reached more than
20% of EU-15 banks’ total consolidated assets
(see Chart 4). Naturally, for some major
international banks this share is much higher,
and the importance of foreign operations is
further boosted through their importance for
total consolidated group income. The situation
is strikingly different in most new EU Member
States, where foreign banks from other EU
countries account for a very large share of the
domestic banking markets (up to close to 100%
in Estonia, for instance).
EU integration has led to convergence in the
operating environment of banks. In particular,
competition has increased, creating more
pressure for efficiency and profitability.
Combined with the income pressures stemming
from more difficult conjunctural conditions,
banks forcefully aimed at cutting costs in
2002-2003. This shows up in the improved
aggregate cost-to-income ratio of EU-15 banks
in 2002 (see Chart 5), as well as in 2003 for a
large number of individual banks (see ECB,
2003b). Banks have reduced costs through
consolidation i.e. mergers and acquisitions and
the consequent reductions in the numbers of
branches and personnel (see ECB, 2003c).
2.3 CHANGING BALANCE OF RISKS
Banks’ participation in securities activities,
links to non-bank financial institutions and
integration change the risks to which banks are
exposed. As discussed more in detail in
the following sections, market and income
volatility risks may have increased in relative
importance, while credit and interest rate risks
(the traditional banking risks) may have
declined. In terms of the overall risks of a bank,
these changes have to be balanced against the
benefits from increased diversification of risks
and economies of scope in the production and
distribution of different financial services.
2.3.1 CREDIT RISKS
Credit risk (i.e. the possibility that lent funds
are not paid back and that the bank suffers a loss
depending on the received collateral) is still
Chart 3 Shares of cross-border activity of
euro area banks
(percentages of total holdings)
Source: ECB.
Note: Cross-border activity refers to cross-euro area activity
in % of outstanding amounts (i.e., excludes cross-border
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undoubtedly the most important risk in
banking. However, its relative importance may
be declining due to the financial innovation,
increased role of financial market-related
risks, improved credit risk management
techniques and more precise capital adequacy
regulation for credit risk, forthcoming in the
new Basel II rules. The two latter developments
have been mutually reinforcing as Basel II is
based on advances in banks’ internal credit risk
modelling, which, in turn, supports further the
development in banks’ risk management
systems.
Credit risk transfer instruments allow banks to
take large risk positions and to re-allocate them
rapidly to third parties. If the activity grows as
expected, this might lead to reduced
transparency of banks’ credit risk positions.
Risk transfer instruments can also transform
credit risk into other risks such as counterparty,
pricing, modelling or legal risks (see ECB,
2004a).
Another important feature is that banks’ credit
risks no longer stem predominantly from on-
balance sheet loans to non-financial
corporations and households, but increasingly
from counterparty risks in lending or
derivatives dealings with other financial
market participants (insurance companies,
securities houses, hedge funds etc.).18 The
apparent concentration of the global activity
in a few major intermediaries may lead to
significant counterparty risk concentrations,
which could be particularly important in OTC
derivative instruments, which have continued
to grow very rapidly. When non-bank financial
activities are conducted within banking groups
(i.e. groups including securities and/or
insurance businesses), the risks from these
activities can affect the financial condition of
these groups directly.
2.3.2 FINANCIAL MARKET-RELATED RISKS
Risks related to financial market movements
(i.e. the potential losses due to changes in
market prices of securities) arise in particular
from banks’ own proprietary trading activities,
which often support asset management and
investment banking businesses. EU banks’
aggregate trading losses have so far been
relatively limited. However, individual
institutions may have exposures that greatly
exceed the average. The failure of Barings in
1995 is an example of how large uncontrolled
open positions in derivative markets can bring
down the entire institution (see Board of
Banking Supervisors, 1995). The trading in
complex financial instruments increases
substantially the importance of adequate risk
management systems and internal risk controls
at individual institutions (see below the section
on operational risks).
Banks typically hold financial instruments for
relatively short time periods in their trading
book, which is marked-to-market. They also
typically engage in extensive hedging due to
the possibility of large and rapid fluctuations in
the value of the portfolio. In turbulent times,
such as those experienced after bursting of the
IT-sector bubble in 2000, banks were faced
18 Counterparty risk refers in the usual way to credit exposure to
counterparties in derivative or structured product
transactions. Counterparty risks may be mitigated by netting
arrangements or collateral supplied under credit support
agreements. Counterparty correlation risk refers to the
possibility of a correlated deterioration in the credit standing
of a counterparty and the underlying reference entity; and,
where applicable, correlation between counterparty, reference
entity and collateral.
Chart 5 Profitability and efficiency of
EU-15 banks
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risk profile with increasing hedging costs and some banks
realised losses due to incomplete hedging.
Banks’ assets on the banking book (including
securities in the investment portfolio) are not
marked-to-market but held at historical cost,
and thus unaffected by daily changes in market
prices. When the value of the investment
portfolio does not reflect the market value of
assets, the increasing (decreasing) value of
these investments increases hidden reserves
(losses). Positive hidden reserves can provide a
useful buffer against income fluctuations.
However, they are also an opaque source of
flexibility.19 Furthermore, changes in interest
rates affect the refinancing costs of assets,
which is the major traditional form of interest
rate risk for banks. Banks hold, however,
increasingly structural hedges against these
on-balance sheet risks.
In addition to on-balance sheet assets, many
banks have large off-balance sheet exposures
to market risks via derivatives. The
fluctuations of the underlying assets affect
directly the value of these instruments. Basel
II, as well as the implementation of IAS will
provide rules on how the reporting of these
items will be conducted. These reforms will
increase the transparency of banks’ activities
and financial condition.
Banks are exposed to financial market
developments also through their income.
Income volatility risks have already
demonstrated their relevance, as the recent
reduction in capital market activity  caused a
significant drop in investment banking
volumes and income for some of the major
European banks.
2.3.3 OPERATIONAL RISKS
Financial contracts are becoming more
complicated with increased financial
innovation enabled by technological
improvements. Furthermore, the growth of
payment and settlement traffic and the
automation of banks’ back office and other
functions has increased the reliance on smooth
operation of IT systems. For these reasons, the
relevance of operational risks has increased
sharply in recent years.20
A failure of internal risk management systems
took place for example with failure of Barings
in 1995 (see Board of Banking Supervisors,
1995). While inadequate internal controls can
lead to problems also in the more traditional
lending business, the speed at which Barings
was brought down by one “rogue trader” is only
possible in modern securities and derivative
markets.
A good example of the vulnerability of banks to
a breakdown in IT systems was provided in
the immediate aftermath of the attack of
11 September 2001, as the telecommunications
system, the major communications tool in the
transfer of payments, was severely disrupted in
the lower Manhattan district (see McAndrews
and Potter, 2002). As a consequence, many
banks were unable to execute payments to each
other via Fedwire, the U.S. gross payments
settlement system operated by the Federal
Reserve, and liquidity became extremely
scarce.  At the same time, the Bank of New
York, a dominant player in the settlement of US
government bonds with several offices located
in and around the World Trade Centre, was
unable to continue operations. To avoid a major
liquidity crisis, the Federal Reserve injected
vast amounts of liquidity into the markets.
The recognition of the importance of operational
risks has resulted in regulatory measures, which
are reflected in the upcoming Basel II capital
requirements. Banks are encouraged to actively
measure the extent of operational risk either with
standard tools suggested in regulation or to
develop their own measurement models.
19 International Accounting Standards (IAS), more specifically
IAS 39, will provide rules on when a financial instrument
should be marked-to-market. All European companies
(including banks) with a stock market listing are required to
prepare consolidated financial statements in accordance with
IAS from 2005 onwards.
20 The Basel II text defines operational risk as the risk of losses
resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people
and systems or from external events. This definition includes
legal risks, but excludes strategic and reputational risks.16
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2.3.4 LIQUIDITY, INFRASTRUCTURE AND
CONTAGION RISKS
Liquidity risks related to interbank money
markets have increased in importance, as banks
become more dependent on the availability of
funds from these markets to finance their
operations. Hence, any shocks to these markets
can become a relevant concern for banks’
stability.21
Interbank money markets can also be a source
of contagion risk, as the size of the key
counterparties has increased through
consolidation. Failure of a key counterparty
can cause significant credit losses to other
banks. Given the increased internationalisation
of the interbank activity, especially in the
common euro-denominated money market,
these contagion risks are increasingly
international (see Chart 3).22
As financial market transactions have vastly
increased, payment volumes have grown
substantially in private settlement systems that
settle on a multilateral netting basis. This has
increased the counterparty risks of banks
participating in these systems and increased the
fragility of the entire system due to a loss of
liquidity and credit risks stemming from a failure
of a major participant. In order to reduce these
risks, the standards developed by central banks
for large-value netting payment systems and
securities settlement systems enable such
systems to withstand the failure of major
participants. In addition, central banks have put
in place gross settlement in their publicly run
systems (in the euro area the TARGET system),
providing real-time finality of payments, which
eliminates the credit risk associated to netting
procedures.
Increased cross-border financial activity has
largely taken the form of an expansion of
exchange trading. This has increased banks’
settlement risks in foreign exchange (so-called
Herstatt-risks). A major improvement in
settling foreign exchange transactions took
place in 2002, as a new settlement arrangement
(Continuous Linked Settlement, i.e. CLS bank)
became operational – at first, in limited
capacity. It ensures that the final transfer of one
currency occurs if and only if the final transfer
of the other currency occurs.
It is important to note that concerns of liquidity
could go beyond the interbank money markets
and payment and settlement systems. The
failure of the Drexel Burnham Lambert Group
in the late 1980s and the market for perpetual
floating rate notes in the mid-1980s were first
illustrations of the importance of market
liquidity outside interbank money markets (see
Allen and Herring, 2001). More recently, the
Russia/LTCM crisis of 1998 has shown that
even though relatively specialised markets
with a concentrated structure are more
susceptible to abrupt declines, these can also
take place in large and diversified markets. The
crisis resulted in a substantial decline in
liquidity in global corporate and emerging
country bond markets. Moreover, the LTCM
incidence highlighted the risk that a disorderly
failure of a major securities player could lead to
contagion via market prices.
When markets suffer from a lack of liquidity,
the pricing of instruments becomes detached
from fundamentals. In a worst-case scenario,
trading reduces substantially, hedging becomes
overly costly or impossible, and market prices
collapse. For banks acting as intermediaries in
financial markets (e.g. as market makers) this
can result in large unforeseen losses. If only few
banks are involved in trading and market making
of instruments, liquidity will be directly affected
by their actions. In a situation where a small
number of key counterparties dominate the
market, such as is the case in OTC derivatives
21 Failures of two Japanese securities houses in 1997 illustrated
this risk. Liquidity shocks caused by these institutions were
substantial enough to force the Bank of Japan to feed liquidity
into the banking system in order to avoid crisis (see Nakaso,
2001). The interbank links were also the source of concern in
the “small bank crisis” of the UK in 1991-92 (see Logan,
2001)  and Continental Illinois  (see Jayanti and Whyte, 1996).
22 Several studies exist that study empirically the possibility of
contagion of individual failures through interbank markets
and find varying degrees of contagion risk. Such studies
include: Sheldon & Maurer (1998), Furfine (2003), Upper &
Worms (2002), and Degryse & Nguyen (2004).17
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framework markets, the failure or discontinuation of one of
the key counterparties may cause serious
disruption in the markets and create problems in
other key counterparties. Since market making is
often done by systemically important
institutions these disruptions may affect general
liquidity and spread to other markets.
2.3.5 IMPLICATIONS FOR BANKING SECTOR
STABILITY
In contrast to the “traditional banking crises” in
1980s and 1990s, new potential sources of
disturbance for banks have emerged from the
structural changes discussed above. While
“traditional” lending – asset price booms
should never be ignored as a potential major
source of instability, the structural
developments compel to develop a broader
approach to macro-prudential analysis in order
to cover all major sources of risk and
vulnerability. In particular, a fully-fleshed
financial stability analysis should cover banks’
exposures to financial markets (including
counterparty risks) and non-bank financial
institutions as potential sources of major
disturbances.
The nature of a potential future banking crisis
may have changed as well, which needs to be
recognised in the framework of macro-
prudential analysis. While runs by retail
depositors may have become a rare event,
effectively prevented by deposit insurance,
runs by wholesale depositors (e.g. other banks
or firms) may have become more important.
While the deepening of markets has improved
the access to funds in normal times, liquidity
may still dry up when it is most needed at times
of financial market turbulence. In addition,
contagion via interbank money markets as well
as other financial markets – increasingly on a
cross-border basis – has become a substantial
cause for concern. The growing role of banks as
back-up liquidity providers, increased use of
complex derivative and other instruments
suggest that banks could be increasingly
affected by contagion risks. Finally, the
systemic implications of operational
disruptions in the settlement of payments have
increased in importance with increased
transaction volumes.
3 OVERVIEW OF THE ANALYTICAL
FRAMEWORK
This Section provides an overview of the
macro-prudential analysis framework adopted
within the ESCB. It covers the main conceptual
issues, elements of the analytical framework,
and the main features of the analysis.
3.1 DEFINITION OF FINANCIAL STABILITY
Financial stability is often not defined at all by
central banks conducting financial stability
analysis and publishing financial stability
reports, or it is defined negatively as financial
instability.23 However, a positive definition of
financial stability is useful to give guidance
on the extent of monitoring that should be
performed (i.e. sectors and links covered). It
is also useful in guiding possible policy
decisions.
The ECB has attempted to derive a working
definition of financial stability (see Padoa-
Schioppa, 2002). This is to be seen as a practical
contribution rather than an academic one.
According to this definition financial stability is
“a condition where the financial system is able
to withstand shocks without giving way to
cumulative processes, which impair the
allocation of savings into investment and the
processing of payments in the economy.”
The definition has a systemic focus, i.e. it
relates to the risk of disturbances spreading
across the area, potentially jeopardising the
core functions of the financial system and
thereby affecting real economic activity. The
reference to cumulative processes highlights
the danger of rapidly spreading disturbances,
which might be particularly difficult to
23 Houben et al. (2004) contains a useful discussion of what is
meant by financial stability or instability (see their Section III
and Appendix II).18
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contain. Structural weaknesses in the financial
system might give rise to quickly spreading
systemic problems once underlying
weaknesses become apparent. For this reason,
it is desirable that authorities in charge of
financial stability also monitor key structural
developments in the financial system.
For analysing financial stability, the concept of
the resilience of the financial system – which is
contained in the definition above – is a useful
starting point. While it is impossible to predict
all shocks that could lead to financial
instability, the propensity of the financial
system for distress can be assessed in terms of
the loss absorbing capability of banks and other
financial institutions. In this area, the key
analytical issue is to identify to what extent the
financial system is exposed to certain risks
(such as a stock market decline) and how well
the system is likely to be able to absorb adverse
disturbances. This robustness, in turn, depends
on the availability of financial buffers at
financial institutions. Optimally, the analysis
should capture potential threats to the stability
of the system before materialisation so that
market participants as well as authorities can
adopt adequate measures.
The ECB definition emphasises the importance
of identifying sources of risk and assessing the
shock-absorbing buffers in the banking sector,
while recognising the likely inability to foresee
all potential sources of instability, which puts
forward the importance of considering several
scenarios and sensitivity analysis.24 To be
reassuring, the financial sector should remain
resilient even in the face of the more severe,
even though less-probable shocks (within the
range of plausible scenarios).25
As noted above, the ECB has adopted a broad
definition of the financial system for its overall
financial stability work. The financial system
is considered to consist of all financial
intermediaries, organised and informal
markets, payments and settlement circuits,
technical infrastructures supporting financial
activity, legal and regulatory provisions, and
supervisory agencies. This wide scope
permits a complete view of the ways in which
savings are channelled towards investment
opportunities, risk is shared among economic
agents, and payments are facilitated across the
economy. It also captures the new risks to
financial stability stemming from financial
markets and non-bank financial institutions
described in Section 2.
The macro-prudential analysis of the banking
sector is central in the overall financial
stability analysis due to the key importance of
banks in the European financial system and for
financial stability.26 The analysis of the
banking sector covers non-bank financial
institutions as long as they are part of the
banking groups (analysed on a consolidated
basis). Analysis of disturbances to financial
markets, other financial institutions (outside
banking groups) and non-financial sectors is
conducted (drawing on the economic analysis
conducted at the ECB and national central
banks) from the perspective of the impact on
banks through direct exposures and second
round effects.27
3.2 THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE ANALYTICAL
FRAMEWORK
Exhibit 1 characterises the main elements of
the macro-prudential analysis framework
adopted within the ESCB. The first part of the
analysis is fully backward-looking and it refers
to the assessment of the current financial
conditions in the banking sector. This provides
a starting point for the analysis of the ability of
the banking sector to withstand possible
24 The analytical framework outlined by Borio (2003) and by
Houben et al. (2004) focuses attention on identifying the
sources of risk to financial stability, while the framework
underlying the IMF FSIs (see further Section 9) stresses the
shock-absorbing buffers in the banking sector (see Evans et al.
2000).
25 The Bank of England financial stability analysis is also based
on a consideration of several and severe shocks (see, e.g.,
Drehmann et al., 2004).
26 See e.g. Schwartz (1986), Padoa-Schioppa (2000) and Houben
et al. (2004).
27 For this reason, financial market and e.g. insurance sector
analyses of the ECB are not covered in this paper.19
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adverse disturbances, as current profitability,
capital adequacy, provisioning reserves and
reserves of liquid assets indicate the size of
banks’ buffers to absorb losses or outflows of
funding sources. A number of MPIs reviewed
in Section 4 are designed for these purposes.
The stability of the banking sector depends on
the degree of risk in the environment in which
banks operate, banks’ exposure to these risks,
their ability to manage these risks, and their
resilience to adverse outcomes. Hence, the
second part of the analysis deals with, first, the
identification of actual exposures of banks to
various sources of risks and the channels
through which these risks could crystallise into
losses for banks. These risks can be common
to all banks (or to a large part of the
banking sector), and stem from external
macroeconomic, sectoral or financial market
conditions, or from endogenous developments
in the banking sector (e.g. over-extension of
credit leading to a system-wide fragility).
Alternatively, banks can be subject to
contagion risks from individual institution’s
liquidity problems or failures in the banking
sector. Assessment of banks’ exposures is
largely based on backward-looking data.
However, the analysis of possible scenarios
under which these exposures could result in
losses requires forward-looking information.
The assessment of potential sources of
vulnerability is complicated by the inherent
problem of deciding whether also “low-
probability but high-impact” should be
included. These disturbances would represent a
real “stress test” of the banking sector stability,
but could be deemed too implausible to be
considered by policy makers. As potential
Exhibit 1 Main elements of the ESCB macro-prudential analysis framework
Step 3: Banking sectors’ ability to withstand disturbances 
Assessment of buffers to cover for risks and 
feed-back from banks to external environment: 
Step 1: Banking sector condition 
Step 2: Sources of risk and vulnerability 
Assessment of possible external disturbances
•  General economy 
•  Financial markets 
Assessment of existing buffers 
•  Profitability 
•  Capital adequacy
•  Liquidity 
Assessment of risk exposures and possible internal 
disturbances
•  Credit risks 
•  Financial market related risks 
•  Operational and legal risks 
•  Liquidity risks
•  Infrastructure risks 
•  Contagion risks 
Assessment of banking sector health using forward-looking market indicators. 20
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shocks can come from unforeseen sources or be
of unforeseen intensity, considering a range of
scenarios is appropriate as noted above.
Another difficulty is to account duly for the
correlation among the sources of risks and
interrelations between macroeconomic and
financial variables. For instance, foreign
exchange or stock price shocks will have
consequences for output developments, and
several financial market shocks could occur
simultaneously, as markets are interrelated.
The MPIs and analytical approaches developed
for this part of the analysis are described in
Section 5. Given the broadening scope of the
potential risks to banks (as argued in Section
2), these indicators need to encompass all
major sources of risk, not only the traditional
sources of credit risk.
The final part of the analysis deals with the
resiliency of banks vis-à-vis the different
combined sources of risk. Indeed, also in line
with the definition of financial stability
adopted at the ECB, the analysis of the impact
of the risks on banks’ financial condition, or
more formally banks’ default risk, is the
ultimate objective of the macro-prudential
analysis. While the assessment of the condition
of banks provides a measure of banking
sectors’ aggregate capital buffer as the first
step, it needs to be complemented with analysis
that captures the “transmission mechanism” of
common shocks to the banking sector. Ideally,
one would also like to include the “feedback”
effects from the banking sector. Few models
are, however, available for this purpose.28
Recent developments in devising default risk
indicators from market prices on firms’
securities also promise useful progress in
constructing indicators reflecting the failure
risk in the banking sector (as well as in other
financial sectors) in a manner, which captures
the multitude of potential risks. Section 6
describes the approaches adopted at the ECB
for this last part of the analytical framework.
3.3 THE SCOPE OF THE ANALYSIS
The macro-prudential analysis of the EU
banking sector has to take into account many
different levels (see Exhibit 2). First, the EU
level analysis aims at evaluating banking
developments  relevant for financial stability
from the perspective of the Single Market.
Second, there is also a need to pay specific
attention to the euro area banking sector due to
increasingly common area-wide macro-economic
factors, foremost monetary and liquidity
conditions and common wholesale financial
markets in euro, which can act as a channel of
contagion. Third, given the significant structural
differences between the old and new EU Member
States, and the need to acquire an adequate
information base, there is also interest to study
separately the new Member States. The
collection of MPIs allows the construction of
aggregates for all these three country groupings.
The fourth identified category relates to
the analysis on individual countries. This is
necessitated by still prevailing differences in
banking and other financial market structures
across EU countries and country-specific
sources of risk (which can create spill-over
effects to other countries). At times this is also a
practical necessity when the data comparability
does not allow aggregation across countries.
This can foremost be the case when ad hoc
indicators are analysed outside the set of
regularly collected MPIs.
Finally, there is also interest in looking at
institution level data. There can be important
differences between institutions of different
size, ownership structure etc., which cut across
countries, and looking at the variance across
institutions can reveal important “weak spots”
in the banking system, which would remain
unnoticed when only aggregates are monitored.
The set of largest EU or euro area banking
institutions also constitutes a set of relevance
from the overall systemic stability perspective
and is regularly monitored for this reason.
28 See, e.g., Drehmann et al. (2004).21
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The starting point for the analysis is the data
from national supervisory authorities. The key
set of MPIs is built from this data set and
complemented with other statistical sources
and data available from financial markets. The
national information on banks is enriched with
data on banks financial statements and market
indicators capturing banks’ default risk (see
Section 6.1). While national supervisory data
are made available at an annual frequency,
publicly available financial statement data, and
especially market data, have higher frequency
than supervisory data. The market data cover
major institutions of relevance for financial
stability. However, they do not provide the
comprehensive picture available from the
supervisory data;29 for instance, publicly
owned banks and small banks may not disclose
frequently their financial statements to the
market or may do so only with a long delay and
market indicators are available only for listed
banks.
The picture is completed with qualitative
information from the authorities participating
in the BSC, and to some extent with views from
market participants. Interviews with major
institutions are helpful in providing the market
participant’s views, particularly when
assessing the potential future market
movements, and are occasionally conducted
through national authorities. In general, having
access to national experience and information
of national authorities operating close to their
institutions is a major benefit of the committee
setting. Though the main purpose is not
national analysis, a relatively detailed view is
needed to understand the heterogeneity of
developments, possible risk concentrations and
contagion channels. Qualitative statements are
particularly important when quantitative
indicators provide conflicting signals. Such
information is typically collected using
questionnaires directed to national authorities
and sometimes to banks.
In sum, the financial stability analysis conducted
within the  ESCB is more than just a set of MPIs.
It is based on an amalgam of different pools of
Exhibit 2 Different levels in ESCB banking sector analysis
EU level
– Integration of financial markets (Single Market).
Euro area
– Increasingly common area-wide macro-economic factors, foremost monetary and liquidity
conditions and common wholesale financial markets in euro.
New EU Member States
– Specific conditions and risks.
National level
– Differences in banking and other financial market structures.
Institution level
– Differences between institutions of different size, business structure, ownership structure
etc.
29 The BSC annual data collection covers close to 100% of the
EU banking sector.22
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quantitative data, authorities’ insight, market
indicators and views, and continuously
improving set of analytical tools. Tools are
continuously developed, in co-operation with
national authorities and international bodies.
4 FINANCIAL CONDITION OF THE BANKING
SECTOR
This Section describes the part of the macro-
prudential analysis, which is aimed at
assessing the most recent developments in the
financial condition (profitability, solvency,
asset quality, and liquidity) of the EU banking
sector and reviews the MPIs collected to this
end. This analysis aims at capturing possible
signs of deterioration in the medium term
profitability, asset quality and solvency trends
to make an initial backward-looking
assessment of the resilience of the sector.
Assessment of the financial condition requires
good understanding of the economic and
financial market developments, as well as
internal banking sector developments (such as
loan and balance sheet growth), since these are
the underlying driving factors behind banking
sector performance.
The MPIs used in this part of the analysis
provide a view of how the banking system
performed under the past economic and
financial market conditions. They cover
the main developments in banks’ income
statement (efficiency, profitability, income
developments), capital adequacy and balance
sheet conditions (asset quality and liquidity).
This approach follows some practices in the
Exhibit 3 Macro-prudential indicators regularly monitored by the ECB
I. INTERNAL FACTORS
1. Profitability, balance sheet quality
and capital adequacy
Income – cost developments and profitability
Income composition
Net interest income per operating income
Income from securities (dividends) per total operating income
Net non-interest income per total operating income
Commissions (net) and fees per total operating income
Trading and forex results per total operating income
Other operating income per total operating income
Cost composition
Staff costs per total costs
Other administrative expenses per total costs
Other operating charges (excl. value adjustments and specific
taxes) per total costs
Value adjustments and specific taxes per total costs
Efficiency
Operating cost (excl. value adjustments and specific taxes)
per total operating income
Number of banks with cost-to-income ratio above 80%
Asset share of banks with cost-to-income ratio above 80%
Range of cost-to-income ratio
Profitability indicators
Profits II (after provisions, before tax and extraordinary
items) per own funds (ROE II)
Profits II (after provisions, before tax and extraordinary
items) per total assets (ROA II)
Profits III (after provisions, tax and extraordinary items) per
own funds (ROE III)
Profits III (after provisions, tax and extraordinary items) per
total assets (ROA III)
Distribution of ROE III: number of banks in each ROE
category
Distribution of ROE III: share of assets of banks in each ROE
category
Number of banks below ROE III of 5%
Share of banks below ROE III of 5% in total assets
Endowment effect as % of total profit before tax
Income and costs as percent of total assets
Net interest income per total assets
Interest receivable per total assets
Interest payable per total assets
Net non-interest income per total assets
Commissions and fees per total assets
Trading and forex results per total assets
Other operating income per total assets
Staff costs per total assets
Other administrative expenses per total assets
Other operating charges (excl. value adjustments and specific
taxes) per total assets
Total operating expenses per total assets
Net value adjustments per total assets
Fund for general banking risks per total assets
Extraordinary profit or loss per total assets
Tax charges per total assets23
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Total assets of the banking sector
Total assets of the reporting institutions per total assets of the
banking sector
Asset composition
Cash and balances per total assets
Tresury bills per total assets
Loans and advances to credit institutions per total assets
Loans and advances to customers per total assets
Debt securities per total assets
Shares and participating interests per total assets
Liability composition
Amounts owed to credit institutions per total assets
Amounts owed to customers (deposits) per total assets
Debts evidenced by certificates per total assets
Funds for general banking risks per total assets
Provisions (stock) per total assets
Subordinated liabilities per total assets







Tier 1 capital ratio
Own funds requirement under CAD (trading book)
Risk-weighted balance sheet items
Risk-weighted off-balance sheet items
Number of banks with risk based capital ratio below 9%
Share of banks with risk based capital ratio below 9% in total
assets
Distribution of risk-based capital ratio: number of banks in
each category
Distribution of risk-based capital ratio: share of risk weighted
assets of banks in each category
Distribution of tier I ratio: number of banks in each category
Asset quality
Total non-performing and doubtful loans (net of provisions)
per total loans and advances
Total non-performing and doubtful loans (net of provisions)
per total own funds
Range of non-performing and doubtful loans (net of
provisions) per capital
Range of non-performing and doubtful loans (net of
provisions) per total loans and advances
Provisioning (stock) per total non performing and doubtful
loans
Flow of provisions
Net value adjustments and fund for general banking risks
(provisioning) per own funds
Net value adjustments and fund for general banking risks
(provisioning) per total operating income
Net value adjustments and fund for general banking risks
(provisioning) per loans and advances
2. Demand and supply (competitive) conditions
Interest receivable per total loans and advances, treasury bills
and debt securities
Interest payable per amounts owed to credit institutions,
customers (deposits), debts evidenced by certificate and
subordinated liabilities
Average margin on new lending
Average margin on new lending to households
Average margin on new lending to non-bank corporations
Average margin on retail deposits
Overall margin
3. Risk concentrations




Loans to other MUMs




Loans to other MUMs
Loans to the rest of the world
Lending to non-MFI private sectors
Total lending
Loans to residents
Loans to other MUMs
Loans to the rest of the world
Lending to households
Lending to non-bank non-financial corporations
Lending to non-bank financial corporations










Composition of other assets
Aggregate fixed income securities holdings
Total
Issued by residents
Issued by other MUMs




Issued by other MUMs




Claims on other MUMs
Claims on rest of the world
Currency and maturity structure of domestic lending
Share of less than one year lending to non-MFIs
Share of lending in foreign currency
Global credit exposures
Aggregate lending to non-bank customers
Aggregate securities holdings
Aggregate balance sheet total
Aggregate credit equivalent of off-balance sheet items24
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Liquidity risk
Ratio of non-bank deposits to M2
Ratio of total loans to non-bank deposits
Share of foreign short-term liabilities
Spread between the unsecured deposit rate and EONIA swap
rate
Spread between the unsecured deposit rate and secured repo
rate
Ratio of liquid assets to total assets
Exposures of EU15 to new EU member countries
Aggregate gross credit exposure to central and eastern Europe
Exposures towards emerging and developing countries
Aggregate total gross credit exposure
Aggregate gross credit exposure to Asian countries





Ratio of VaR to Tier I
4. Market assessment of risks
All bank share price index vs. all share price index
Average yield spread between bank bonds and government
bonds
Average yield spread between interbank CDs and treasury
bills
Range of spreads between bank bonds and government bonds
Number of bank rating downgrades within the observation
period
Distance to default of major EU banks
Credit default swap spreads
Range of interbank and CD rates
II.EXTERNAL FACTORS
5. Financial fragility
Aggregate total debt to equity ratio in the (non-bank)
corporate sector
Ratio of household total debt to household financial (and real)
assets
Household savings ratio
Ratio of corporate debt servicing payments to corporate net
earnings




Median expected default frequencies (EDFs) for key industries





Technology and telecommunications (TMT)
Energy and utilities (EnU)
Residual category (Oth)




Commercial real estate prices
Residential real estate prices
7. Cyclical and monetary conditions
Rate of real GDP growth
Rate of nominal GDP growth
Rate of growth in real aggregate investment
Rate of growth in real private consumption
Rate of growth of unemployment rate
Rate of change in M2
Rate of change in the money market interest rate (3 month)
Rate of change of long-term real interest rate (10 yr. govt.
bond)
Rate of change in the exchange rates (EUR, DKK, GBP, GRD
and SEK)
Rate of change in the consumer price index
III.CONTAGION FACTORS
8. Interbank markets
Share of interbank liabilities in total liabilities
Share of assets of the three banks with largest exposures
(separately for each counterparty country) vis-à-vis total
banking sector assets
Share of assets of the five banks with largest exposures
(separately for each counterparty country) vis-à-vis total
banking sector assets
micro-prudential field, for instance, the
CAMEL supervisory ratings assigned by US
authorities.30 These MPIs are built through
aggregation of micro-prudential figures.
Exhibit 3 presents the list of core MPIs
regularly monitored (including also MPIs used
in the other parts of the analysis).
The analysis is usually conducted over a 3-5
year period in order to assess the persistency of
trends in banks’ performance and balance sheet
structure31. The analysis is conducted using
both the annual data provided by supervisory
national authorities as well as on the quarterly
30 CAMEL = Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management
(=efficiency), Earnings, Liquidity. See also Evans et al.
(2000) for a discussion of the aggregation of micro-prudential
indicators.
31 Major changes in regulations (Basel II) and accounting
standards may complicate or hinder comparisons as they may
cause large breaks in the series.
32 The MPIs discussed below apply to both data sets unless
otherwise mentioned.
data collected from individual institutions’
financial statements.32 As discussed further in
Sections 7 and 8, the analysis needs to be based
on fully consolidated data covering banks’ all
relevant activities. This requires cross-border
as well as cross-sector consolidation.25
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DISTRIBUTION INDICATORS USED IN THE ESCB MACRO-PRUDENTIAL ANALYSIS
A number of distribution indicators are collected to measure variation in the key indicators of
the EU banking sectors. For the consolidated banking data produced by the national
authorities, key ones are the distributions of the ROE as well as total capital and Tier 1 ratios.
These distributions are expressed as share of total assets of the sample (see e.g. the chart
below) and /or number of banks.
Since full distributions of all key indicators
are burdensome to produce, in certain sub-
samples burden is limited by using
information just on the lower tails. This
allows monitoring the fatness of the lower
tails as well as movements in the tails over
time. For example, while full distributions
are collected for the whole sample of banks
reported by the national authorities, only
tails information is collected on sub-
samples of small, medium and large banks
with reduced burden of data compilation.
Key indicators include total solvency ratio
and cost-to-income ratio (CI). For each size
group, number and asset share of banks with
total solvency ratio below 9% is collected while in the case of CI, the number and asset share of
banks with cost-to-income ratio above 80% is collected.
The sample of 50 largest EU banks is used to complement the consolidated national banking
data. In this sample, distributions as well as tail information are used. Using a smaller sample
where key indicators are available for all banks, correlations between different key indicators
can be studied to see if same banks appear in distribution tails of a number of indicators. In the
tails analysis, attention is usually directed to both lowest and highest 5% of the distribution.
Asset share of EU-15 banks in each ROE
category
(percentages, measured against total assets in the sample)
0

















The first set of internal factors contains the
measures of the financial condition of banks. As
noted, indicators are applied at the aggregated
EU/euro area and national levels on the basis of
mostly weighted averages in order to account for
differences in bank sizes. The total banking
sector view is enriched also by constructing
indicators separately for sectors of large,
medium-size, and small banks. Owing to the
importance of these indicators, distribution
information across individual banks is also
collected for the full banking sector. Box 1
describes how these distribution indicators are
constructed.  Information on the number and
share of assets of banks in each ROE (and also
capital ratio, see below Section 4.2) category
provides a view to possible fragilities in the
banking sector. Additional market information
from a sample of systemically important
institutions is also used to enrich the analysis.
Key profitability indicators in this analysis are
“return on equity” (ROE) and “return on assets”
(ROA). ROE provides a useful measure of the26
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profitability of equity investment in banking,
while ROA provides the return on total assets of
banks. The numerator of both indicators is
calculated using data from banks’ income
statements and typically evaluated after tax and
extraordinary items in order to assure
comparability with the approach followed
usually by market analysts. Profitability is,
however, also computed before these items (and
also before provisions) in order to assess banks’
underlying operating profitability, unaffected
by national differences in taxation, or windfall
gains or losses.
It is important to note that neither the ROE nor
the ROA provides a view of the level of risk
involved in generating the income. Since
higher returns are usually possible when
engaging in operations with higher risks, it is
important also to study the reasons behind very
high values of these indicators.
Indicators providing information on income
and cost structure (income composition
measured against total income and cost
composition measured against total costs), as
well as income and cost growth and efficiency
can provide some initial indication whether the
level of profitability reflects sound operations.
This analysis is also needed to see if occasional
losses are due to fundamentally weak
performance. Growth of income broken down
by income source together with composition of
income can reveal potential vulnerabilities in
income sources. For example, if banking sector
is moving towards more volatile pro-cyclical
income sources (high growth rates and
increasing share of these items of the total
income), this is likely to cause major
fluctuations in income at the downward phase
of the economic cycle or depressed financial
market conditions.
Changes in total operating costs, and in the
breakdown between staff and non-staff costs,
indicate potential changes in strategy of banks,
for instance decreasing costs indicate cost
containment. However, careful analysis of
costs vis-à-vis income is required as large cost
cuts can impair banks’ ability to generate
income in the future. Combining cost data with
qualitative information on strategic measures
taken by banks gives a view to driving forces
behind changes in costs. Since cost information
on P&L accounts combine price information
with quantities, the actual assessment of
efficiency of the banking sector is difficult.33
As a proxy for efficiency, cost-to-income ratio
is mainly used, which is a widespread practice
amongst banking sector analysts.
In addition to financial and operating costs,
loan loss provisions are typically a major factor
affecting banks’ profitability. Thus they are an
integral part of the profitability as well as asset
quality analysis (see below Section 4.3).34
4.2 SOLVENCY INDICATORS
Key indicators for measuring capital buffers
are regulatory solvency ratios (such as “total
capital ratio” and “Tier1 ratio”). Current
regulatory Tier 1 equity ratio and full capital
ratio are relatively weakly risk-sensitive
measures, which renders them basically
backward-looking measures of banks’
financial soundness. Currently, the ratios are
computed using rough risk buckets, which
assign different weights for different assets
depending on the risks involved. But since the
buckets are very wide, these measures are
insensitive to credit risk. However, on the
positive side it needs to be recognised that the
current ratios are relatively comparable across
countries. In addition to total capital ratio, it is
important to monitor the Tier 1 as well in order
to gauge the amount of high-quality equity,
which has the greatest ability to absorb losses.
There is also interest in monitoring the straight
(non-weighted) equity to total assets ratio for
banks in order to gauge potential major shifts in
banks’ balance sheet structure towards higher
failure risk (see further Section 6).
33 This would require information on quantities of produced
services and used resources.
34 It should be noted that the treatment of provisions will change
from 2005 onwards owing to application of IAS on listed
banks.27
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Basel II will introduce considerably more risk-
sensitivity in the requirements for banks’ capital
adequacy based on banks’ internal risk
assessments (rating systems) or external ratings.
This will affect especially the capital
requirements on corporate sector credit risks.
Basel II will bring regulatory capital measures
closer to economic capital, which also increases
the information content of these indicators
for financial stability analysis. However,
comparability between banks could become
more difficult as the capital adequacy ratios can
be affected by differences in banks’ internal
systems on which their measurement will be
based.
Profitability and solvency measures together
provide a rough estimate of banks’ condition.
Low profitability combined with regulatory
solvency ratios close to required minimums will
signal severe weakness in the banking sector and
points to low ability to absorb adverse
disturbances. In addition to the levels of these
indicators, their changes are also important in
analysing the condition of banks. Rising ROE
and solvency indicators are a positive sign, while
falling profitability but rising solvency may
indicate that banks are increasing their capital
buffers to prepare for lower profitability.
4.3 ASSET QUALITY AND LIQUIDITY
INDICATORS
Information on non-performing and doubtful
assets presents a backward-looking view to
credit quality. High values for the key ratios,
such as non-performing and doubtful assets to
total loans and advances or to equity capital
reflect the aggregate low quality of bank loans.
Information on non-performing and doubtful
assets is particularly useful if breakdowns by
industries are available (which is unfortunately
not the case for most EU countries). Coverage
ratios of non-performing assets to the provision
reserves are used for describing the ability of
the banking system to prepare for possible
losses. At the moment, it is important to note
that EU wide analysis of non-performing and
doubtful assets and provisioning stocks suffer
from large differences in the definitions
between countries.
Data on provisions on the income statement
provide a view to the changes in asset quality.
This flow of information contains new
provisions for losses on credits (negative item)
as well as cancellations of past provisions and
income from collateral sales (positive items).
Under adverse conditions, with deteriorating
asset quality, banks’ results can quickly
weaken with increased provisions. On the other
hand, first signs of improved conditions are
often reflected in provisioning which often
decreases before the pick-up in income. This
reflects firms’ balance sheet improvements
before new investments (improving banks’
income via increased lending) take place.
Provisioning practices and rules vary quite
widely between different EU countries.
However, in general it is important to note that
forward-looking features in provisioning are
relatively limited owing to strict accounting
and taxation rules. In most European countries,
provisions reflect already realised or relatively
certain losses in the near future, which means
that provisioning is mostly pro-cyclical.35
Write-offs and write-downs of other assets also
impact banks’ profitability. Even though these
measures have a negative impact on banks’
profitability, they are welcome from the point
of view of the analysis as they contribute
to better transparency of banks’ financial
condition via reduction of hidden losses.
Balance sheet indicators can reveal structural
liquidity problems as well. For instance, the
indicators of liquid assets to total assets ratios
indicate the availability to cover liquidity
outflows, and the liability-side indicators
cover the dependency on particular funding
sources (see also Section 5.4 for further
discussion on liquidity risk indicators).
35 The statistical provisioning system introduced in Spain or
dynamic provisioning in France constitute major exceptions,
as in these cases provisions include a charge for future
expected credit losses as well.28
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4.4 DRIVERS OF BANK PROFITABILITY
The analysis of banks’ past profitability
developments relies on information on major
external economic and financial sector
developments. In the set of regularly reviewed
MPIs, the data on cyclical and monetary
conditions and asset price developments is
helpful for this purpose. This information is
complemented with data on financial market
activity volumes, foremost issuance of bonds
and equity and syndicated loan market volumes
from commercial databases, as these
developments increasingly affect banks’ income
development (through investment banking and
asset management activity) (see Section 2).
These external developments also affect banks’
balance sheet items (structure and growth of
specific items). Profitability developments are
usefully assessed using longer time series data
on the key balance sheet items, as current
profitability reflects past activities of banks.
Growth rates in interest bearing assets and
liabilities and banks’ margins are the key
drivers of banks’ net interest income.  Balance
sheet ratios and growth rates are collected from
national authorities on consolidated basis. In
addition, as explained in detail in Section 7,
credit growth rates based on unconsolidated
money and banking statistics (MBS), and price
and margin information on funding and lending
by banks (demand and supply conditions)
based on banks’ interest rate statistics (MIR)
are regularly analysed.36
Deposits and overall margins, as well as
margins on new lending are regularly computed
to assess changes in the margins earned by
banks driven by competitive pressure. In
addition to competitive conditions, this
provides a view to the changes in banks’ risk
premiums on the lending side (see Box 2). The
euro area bank lending survey, regularly
conducted by the ECB, provides useful
additional information on supply and demand
conditions, including credit standards.37
Box 2
DERIVATION OF INTEREST MARGINS
Calculation of interest rates:
Four aggregated national MFI interest rates have been calculated for each euro area country
individually, and also for the euro area as a whole, using the respective outstanding balance
sheet items (BSI data) as weights. The four national rates are:
1. Aggregated deposit rate: Weighted average of the interest rates on deposit rates with agreed
maturity up to one year, over one and up to two years and over two years maturity for both
households and non-financial corporations.
2. Aggregated lending rate: Weighted average of the interest rates on lending to households
for consumption, house purchases and other purposes and to non-financial corporations with
an amount below EUR 1 million and an amount over EUR 1 million. Floating rates or rates
with an agreed maturity up to one year, over one and up to five years, and over five years
maturity for both households and non-financial corporations are included in the weighted
average.
36 The non-consolidated MBS data provided by national
authorities to the ECB for monetary policy purposes take into
account the reclassification and revaluation items necessary
for “clean” growth rates. As mentioned above, these items are
currently not available for consolidated balance sheet data.
See Section 7 for statistical issues.
37 Available from the ECB web-site: www.ecb.int/stats/money/
lend/html/index.en.html.29
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of risk 3. Aggregated lending rate to households: Weighted average of the interest rates on lending to
households for consumption, house purchases and other purposes. Floating rates or rates
with an agreed maturity up to one year, over one and up to five years, and over five years
maturity are included in the weighted average.
4. Aggregated lending rate to non-financial corporations: Weighted average of the interest
rates on lending to non-financial corporations with an amount below EUR 1 million and an
amount over EUR 1 million. Floating rates or rates with an agreed maturity up to one year,
over one and up to five years and over five years are included in the weighted average.
All rates and corresponding amounts used for weighting are based on new lending.
Calculation of margins:
The overall margin is the difference between the aggregated lending rate and the aggregated
deposit rate.
With regard to the margin calculations on lending and deposits, ideally, loan and deposit rates
would be contrasted with market rates of exactly the same maturities, taking into account whether
the loans are variable or fixed rate loans. This reference rate represents the corresponding yield on
an alternative investment. This is not possible when dealing with aggregated statistics. Rather
than choosing a single reference rate for calculating the lending and deposit margins, a reference
rate is constructed separately for each of the three lending rates and the deposit rate, hence taking
into account the different underlying maturity structures in different countries.
As a result of this procedure, one-year rates seem to be appropriate as the reference rate for
deposits and lending to non-financial corporations. One year rates are also used as reference
rates for lending to households in Finland, Spain, and Sweden, the three-year rate is used in
Greece, five year rates are used for Austria, Germany, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands, and
ten-year rates are used in Belgium, France and Luxembourg. For Portugal even shorter rates are
appropriate for loans and also deposits, owing to a high degree of dependency on short-term
money market rates in banks’ variable rate businesses.
Interest rate swap rates were deemed to be the most appropriate basis for the reference, since
they provide the common reference base for different maturities needed for the analysis. The
swap rates are usually close to the money market rates and government bond yields, which are
typically reference rates in this context. However, potential changes in the swap-to-
government bond spreads may affect the comparisons over time to some extent, as the swap
rates are not risk-free.
5 IDENTIFICATION OF SOURCES OF RISK
This Section describes the approaches used to
identify sources of risk to which banks are
exposed from potential common shocks or from
idiosyncratic failures that create contagion in
the system.38 In other words, this part of the
analysis combines the intelligence on possible
adverse developments with information on
banks’ exposures in order to focus on relevant
sources of risk to banking sector stability.
The analysis of the potential sources of
risk naturally extends the backward-looking
38 The analysis of contagion risks is covered in Section 6.30
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analysis of the main drivers of bank
profitability and solvency described above by
introducing forward-looking elements,
including economic forecasts. As discussed in
Section 2, the analysis of actual or potential
sources of risk for the banking sector stability
should be broad-based. At the moment, credit,
market and liquidity risks are covered through
quantitative indicators, while (the increasingly
relevant) operational risks are based on
qualitative assessment by supervisory
authorities.39 While the separate analysis of
different risks is useful in identifying key
potential weaknesses, a number of factors
driving the crystallisation of different risks
could materialise simultaneously. This is why
an encompassing view to risks is required,
taking into account the possible correlations
among them.
5.1 SOURCES OF CREDIT RISK
Shocks generated by real economic
developments may hit banks via numerous
channels, most importantly via credit risk (but
not exclusively as there can be an impact on
financial market factors). This, combined with
general weakness in banks’ income generation
in subdued economic conditions, may
eventually erode capital buffers to the extent
that banking system faces crisis. Indeed, at the
most aggregated level, the health of banks’
credit portfolios depends on the overall
economic conditions.40 Hence, potential
relevant disturbances can be based on available
economic forecasts and deviations from
baseline forecasts can be formally constructed
from probability distributions underlying the
forecast macroeconomic variables in order to
generate downside scenarios of relevance for
the financial stability assessment.
In order to assess the future potential losses
generated by the lending behaviour of banks,
detailed information on the existing credit
exposures (backward-looking data) is needed.
This is provided by the overall exposures to
these sectors, particularly to households and
non-financial firms, and to specific industries
39 The implementation of Basel II might provide in the future
quantitative indicators also for the use of the banking sector
stability analysis also as regards operational risks.
40 See Borio (2003) and the literature cited therein.
(see Exhibit 3 for the MPIs on risk
concentrations). The more detailed the
information is, the more accurate the
assessment. However, only relatively
aggregated information, comparable across
countries, is available on different industries.
In addition, data on geographical breakdowns
of banks’ lending are needed. Since shocks can
easily spread from relatively volatile emerging
markets, information on the lending to these
markets is particularly useful. Additional
information on the amount of guarantees and
other risk mitigation and off-balance sheet
exposures may be collected on an ad hoc basis
from national supervisory authorities in order
to have a better view of banks’ net credit
exposures.
Credit growth rates help assess the potential
vulnerabilities in the future, conditional on
economic developments, since a problem loan
starts materialising usually 2-3 years after the
loan has been granted. In addition, a thorough
assessment of the condition of borrower sectors
based on indicators of borrowers’ financial
condition and default risk is indispensable.
Macroeconomic data (e.g. income vs. debt
developments) can be used as a starting point.
This, as well as data on sovereign bond spreads
(in case of emerging market borrowers), is also
useful in analysing the condition of borrower
countries.
Concerning the corporate sector, the analysis is
enriched by indebtedness data from Financial
Accounts, data on payment arrears, bankruptcy
information and different confidence indicators.
In addition, sectoral output and income growth
forecasts are necessary for the assessment.
Furthermore, forward-looking industry-specific
default risk indicators, such as expected default
frequencies (EDFs) are utilised in conjunction
with bank exposure data collected from national
authorities to draw conclusions on exposures at
risk (see Table 1). This latter analysis is31
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especially useful in highlighting risky and
relevant borrower sectors.41
In the case of households, lending for housing
purchase forms the most important category of
loans in EU on aggregate. Information on
household sector indebtedness, loan servicing
costs, fixed versus floating rate loans
information, loan-to-value ratios, payment
arrears etc. are important in assessing banks’
risks. All of these indicators are not regularly
collected due to the large burden, but
monitored on a less frequent basis or covered in
special reports (see ECB, 2000). Additionally,
information on housing price developments is
needed to assess the potential real estate market
fragility and is regularly collected. Banks’
exposure to mostly unsecured consumer
lending is also regularly monitored.
Finally, information is increasingly collected
on banks’ off-balance sheet activities in order
to gauge the amount of contingent credit risk
exposures and exposures to counterparty credit
risks though derivatives activities. Off-balance
sheet items are broken down to contingent
liabilities, commitments and derivatives.
Derivatives are marked-to-market. While
off-balance sheet information is generally
very heterogeneous, hindering aggregation,
information on notional net credit risk transfer
from reports available from markets are used
as a proxy to track the development in some
segments of these markets.42
41 It should be noted that even though the full cross-sector
consolidated view internalises most of the risks, induced by
exposures of the banking sector to other financial institutions,
in many cases insurance sector risks are still excluded.
Challenges in this area are well recognised and further work to
improve the analysis is on the way.
42 See for example FitchRatings (2003a and 2003b) and Standard
& Poor’s (2003).
It is important to note that if banks’ risk
management is up to date, banking crisis
caused by deteriorating credit quality should
not take place. Very few disturbances, perhaps
with the exception of market liquidity crisis,
can result in major losses in the banking system
without internal weakness in the sector. For
this reason, qualitative information from
national supervisors on banks’ risk
management practices is an important part of
the analysis.
It can not be excluded that external shocks may
be augmented by national structural biases e.g.
distortions in national banking markets or
overly large exposures to certain industries,
including other financial entities. As discussed
above under assessing banks’ condition with
backward-looking data, information on
competitive conditions, including information
on margins can also be used to assess the
soundness of the pricing of credit risk. Margin
information is also compared with comparable
bond spreads to indicate possible pricing
differences between banking markets and
capital markets. Under excessive competition,
there is a danger that risk premiums are cut to
Sources: Banking Supervision Committee, Moody’s KMV and ECB calculations.
Note: The data are provided by Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Austria and Finland. The sectors are basic and construction
(BaC), consumer cyclicals (CCy) and non-cyclicals (CNC), capital goods (Cap), energy and utilities (EnU), financial (Fin), and
technology and telecommunications (TMT). The expected default frequency is computed by multiplying the exposure to a sector by
the EDF of this sector.
BaC EnU Cap CCy TMT CNC Fin
(EUR billions), end-2003 675,965.0 144,767.0 246,045.5 1,421,957.8 117,700.0 608,620.7 2,316,379.5
Sectoral EDF (as of May 2003) 1.04 0.26 1.85 1.465 4.95 0.89 0.19
Sectoral EDF (as of June 2004) 0.83 0.18 1.375 0.81 2.875 0.65 0.18
Change in exposure at risk
(EUR billions) -144,363.5 -128,61.1 -132,921.4 -1,179,063.7 -303,640.0 -151,512.3 132,740.8
% change in exposure at risk,
2002-2003 -20.5 -33.0 -28.2 -50.6 -47.3 -27.7 46.7
Table 1 Credit exposures at risk in the banking sectors of seven euro area countries32
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win over market shares. This can create major
fragilities into the banking system.
5.2 RISKS FROM FINANCIAL MARKETS
The concept of financial market risks reaches
beyond that of market risks on trading book of
banks. In the discussion below, the impact from
market developments on banks’ investment
book is also considered (see e.g. interest rate
and exchange rate risks).
The assessment of financial market related
risks is complicated by the fact that shocks to
financial market variables cannot be generally
forecast. However, this shortcoming is reduced
by the ability to obtain some views of market
expectations from implied volatility measures
or Risk Neutral Densities (RND) obtained from
option prices (see e.g. Karampatos et al. 2003).
The latter can be used to gauge the probabilities
market participants’ address to certain market
movements. The potential risks to market
prices are also gauged from more traditional
indicators, such as price-earnings ratios. These
indicators are regularly used in financial
stability analysis.
In the context of the ESCB, in line with the
increased relevance of market-related risks,
more and more quantitative indicators are being
compiled and more are planned for the future.
However, qualitative information from national
supervisory authorities, such as information on
banks’ hedging practices, continues to form an
important input for the analysis.
The most widely used form of assessing market
risk exposure on the trading book is
represented by the Value-at-Risk (VaR)
methodology. During the last couple of years
regulators have allowed financial institutions
to use their internal risk models to measure
market risk and to allocate economic capital.
For these purposes, VaR has become the most
common concept. It measures the potential
portfolio loss that may be endured as a result of
adverse market price moves.43 Market risks
related to banks’ trading book activities are
regularly assessed using information on large
institutions’ VaR indicators. Total VaR figures
for all market risks together are collected and
contrasted to banks’ equity (Tier 1) capital in
order to evaluate banks’ risk absorption
capability. Breakdowns into equity and interest
rate risk VaRs are also collected, to the extent
available. When using VaRs in the analysis it is
important to note that there may be major
differences in construction and modelling
of VaRs between banks which may make
comparisons difficult between institutions.
In order to assess the risks related to assets,
which are not marked to market (e.g. banks’
investment books), balance sheet values are
collected. Due to the relative importance of
banks in the European financial system,
specific attention has been recently given to
foreign exchange risks and overall interest rate
risks which in terms of banks’ balance sheet
assets seem to be more relevant at the moment
than trading book risks. These risks are
analysed on the basis of input from national
supervisors while regular indicators are being
considered. Data used for the analysis includes
aggregate fixed income securities holdings,
aggregate equity holdings and currency
structure of the balance sheet.
Foreign exchange risks at the banking group
level can come from two different sources.
First, (unhedged) group level mismatches in
asset/liability positions (including off-
balance-sheet items) denominated in the
volatile currency and/or mismatches of
respective income and cost streams can
produce negative valuation and profitability
effects. These risks are most material for large
EU banking groups with significant global
43 VaR is more precisely defined as the maximum loss that will
not be exceeded with a certain probability (95% or 99%)
during a holding period of one or ten days (ten days for
regulatory purposes). The greatest difficulty in VaR is the
modelling of the loss distribution of a portfolio. The most
convenient of distributions, namely normal distribution, is an
inadequate proxy as loss distribution should have a “fat tail”.
Usually, past data are used to model the distribution.
Depending on the phase of the cycle covered by data as well as
length of the period from which data is collected, this can
result in too high or too low risk estimates.33
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of risk trading and investment banking operations.
These groups can have significant amounts of
assets and income related to these operations
denominated for example in USD, while their
liabilities – and especially cost – can be
denominated in euro or sterling (Continental-
European or London-based operations).
Second, even if the group level positions and
income/cost flows were balanced in the
currency in question (e.g. foreign subsidiaries
that are fully funded in the local currency) there
are translation effects which materialise when
profits from foreign operations are
consolidated into parent banks’ accounts. This
is the negative effect on the group’s profits
stemming from (unhedged) conversion of the
profits of these operations denominated in the
depreciating currency into the group’s
accounting currency (i.e. euro or sterling in the
case of major EU banking groups).44
As regards the overall interest rate risk, work is
under way to consider the collection of
duration gap information, or alternative
indicators based on e.g. maturity gap analysis.
Duration measures the sensitivity of assets (or
liabilities) to changes in interest rates.
Duration gap is defined as the difference
between the weighted average durations of
assets and liabilities, where the weights of the
two durations are assigned according to the
relative value of interest-bearing assets and
liabilities in a bank balance sheet.45 Duration
gap gauges the impact of changes in interest
rates on bank capital while maturity gap can be
used to measure the impact of changes in
interest rates on bank’s interest income.
In addition, compilation of banks’ stress test
information is being considered. This could
also cover a wider spectrum or risks in addition
to interest rate risks. Sensitivity stress tests
focusing on the effects of a single risk factor
change on banks’ income or capital are the
simplest form of stress testing. Interest rates
seem to be the most common theme among
these tests, which indicates that banks are
comfortable controlling their interest rate risk
with sensitivity tests rather than scenario
analysis (see below).46 However, sensitivity
stress tests perform basically the same function
as duration gap and VaR analyses as they
essentially only stress a single risk factor (or a
set of closely related risk factors, such as a
yield curve changes).47 Simple sensitivity
stress tests cannot capture risks due to
correlated shocks in the environment. For this
purpose, stress test scenarios are devised,
which are based on potential market events
with simultaneous impacts on a large set of
variables. Such stress tests in principle allow
analysing the effects of combination of
correlated disturbances, including interest rate
shocks, on banks’ balance sheets. These events
can be presented through various balance sheet
projections, together with several funding and
hedging solutions. Simulations can be based on
modelling of the balance sheet, which is likely
to vary from bank to bank, and the relevant
margins. Though complex to construct, such
complete stress test scenarios would clearly
represent a useful complement for the simple
maturity gap or duration analysis.
5.3 OPERATIONAL RISKS
At the moment, no consistent quantitative
measures are available to form aggregate
indicators of operational risk. In the context of
the EU/euro area, analysis relies on qualitative
information provided by the national
authorities.
44 The currency mismatches in specific operations or at overseas
subsidiaries can be offset by opposite trading positions (and
consequently opposite valuation effects and trading gains) at
the group’s centre. However, this strategy requires full
currency matching of the asset and earnings positions at the
group level. An alternative or complementary risk mitigation
strategy is hedging via currency derivative contracts. The
marked to market values of the hedges are booked in the
banking groups’ centres and valuation changes will have an
impact on banks’ profitability.
45 Duration is the weighted average term to maturity of a
financial instrument on the basis of its future cash flows.
46 For stress test types and development see CGFS (2001).
47 There can be also other reasons why risks are inadequately
captured by statistical risk measures like VaR: a lack of
historical price data, a tendency of markets to gap, illiquidity,
or difficulties in estimating the highly non-linear exposures
from options dealing. For these reasons, sensitivity stress
tests may offer an alternative to VaR (see the CGFS report op.
cit.)34
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Measurement of operational risk will improve
with adoption of Basel II regulatory framework
as this risk is included in allocation of capital,
together with credit and market risks. The
new capital adequacy regime introduces
three risk-sensitive options for measuring
operational risk. These are the Basic indicator
approach, Standardised Approach and Advanced
Measurement Approach. These approaches vary
in sophistication with the most advanced one
requiring banks to use their internal loss data in
the estimation of required capital. The analysis
conducted in the context of the ESCB is likely to
benefit greatly from the new well defined
framework. Collection of detailed solvency
information will help to construct aggregate
indicators for the EU and euro area banking
sectors in order to measure also operational risk.
5.4 LIQUIDITY AND CONTAGION RISKS
Liquidity and contagion risks are closely linked,
as discussed in Section 2. Severe liquidity crises
in one financial market segment can easily
spread to other market segments. If markets
loose confidence on the solvency of an
institution, this will first show up as lack of short
term funding in interbank markets to this
institution.
In the case of liquidity risk, it is particularly
important to have both the system wide view as
well as the view to the condition of individual
institutions. It is a well-recognised fact that EU
banking system is tiered i.e. smaller locally
oriented banks relying on liquidity provision
from larger internationally oriented banks.
There are also clear financial centres in EU
where key market players provide liquidity to
the rest of the EU via interbank markets (see
e.g. Cabral et al., 2002). This “tiering”
emphasises the importance of identifying
and analysing liquidity and solvency of
the systemically important institutions. For
this purpose measuring banks’ relevance as
counterparties is needed.
While there is no one agreed measure for
systemic importance of an institution, a large
set of possible proxies are available from
market sources. For instance, bookrunner lists
on different financial market segments, such as
OTC derivatives markets, can be used.48 Owing
to continued global integration of financial
markets, it is important to recognise that
institutions outside the EU may also be
systemically relevant for the stability of the
EU/euro area banking systems. Many of the
large global banks act as relevant
counterparties for EU institutions.  In addition,
as discussed above, the possible systemic
importance of non-bank financial institutions
should be regularly assessed. For instance, the
increased hedge fund activity has raised
interest globally towards these funds. While
their share of total assets held by financial
institutions is still relatively small their
importance in daily trading can be significant.49
In order to monitor banks’ access conditions to
money markets, interbank market spreads are
monitored continuously at the level of market
averages and individual major banks. Since the
spread between interbank deposits and repo
contracts summarises the total premium for
liquidity and (perceived) credit risk in the
interbank money market charged on a bank, it
seems most natural in the context of financial
stability to monitor this spread. If the liquidity
premium can be considered to remain constant,
the movements in the depo-repo spread only
reflect the credit risk premium. Spreads with
different maturities may also have different
interpretations. While a widening of the depo-
repo spread at longer maturities of around one
year implies that it may be difficult for banks to
cover their structural long-term liquidity
deficits, a widening of very short maturity
spreads, at one week or one month maturities,
may be indicative of the more urgent
vulnerability that banks cannot raise the very
short-term liquidity they need to carry out their
payments.
Particularly useful for contagion risk analysis
are data on, and market concentrations in,
48 See e.g. Bank of England (2003).
49 See e.g. ECB (2004b) and (2004c).35
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banking sector different market segments, particularly in the
interbank markets. A thorough analysis of
potential contagion would require detailed
information (including names of individual
institutions) on connections between banks in
order to map the full interbank network. This
would enable stress testing of the resilience of
the network of banks. However, as these data
are usually confidential, less complete analysis
can also be used. General information of
concentrations, major market players and
volumes of interbank deposits and liabilities
are useful in this regard. Work is also ongoing
in analysing spillover effects of very large
shocks among EU banks using e.g. distance-
to-default measure (see below Section 6.1).50
A set of MPIs includes the so-called contagion
factors. This aims to capture the interbank
market linkages between banks from different
countries at the aggregated level. These
indicators measure the concentration of
interbank assets and liabilities at the country
level.51 The more concentrated the liabilities, for
instance, the greater is the risk of contagion of
solvency problems from banks of this country.
The more concentrated the assets, the greater the
risk of transmission of liquidity shortages,
should these banks withdraw their lending
activities in the market. These concentration
indicators are confidential and are infrequently
updated to alleviate reporting burden. On the
other hand, interbank market structures do not
seem to change very frequently.
6 RISK ABSORPTION CAPABILITY OF THE
BANKING SECTOR
The final part of the analysis is perhaps the most
analytically challenging as it tries to measure the
actual impact of possible disturbances identified
on the banking system as a whole. There are
recent advances in the literature, which also
provide tools to quantify the impact. These
papers focus on one or more of the three main
aspects in this field: default risk indicators for
banks from financial markets, links between
macro-economic developments and banks’
condition and stress testing.52 It is beyond the
scope of this paper to review these contributions
in detail. This Section rather concentrates on the
tools so far adopted within the  ESCB for the
macro-prudential analysis of the banking sector.
6.1 MARKET-BASED INDICATORS OF BANKING
SECTOR DEFAULT RISK
The recent development of market-based
indicators of default risk offers some clear
benefits for assessing banking sector fragility.
Market indicators are forward-looking (as they
are based on prices in efficient securities
markets) and they are available at a high
frequency. Most importantly, they should be all
encompassing, i.e. they should reflect different
sources of risk, interactions between banks and
they should take into account banks’ capital
buffers to withstand risks. Gropp (2004) argues
that this is the inherent advantage of market
indicators and an analytical approach to
financial stability assessment based on them
rather than on various indicators trying to
capture the dynamics of a traditional lending –
asset price cycle. Given the discussion in
Section 2, this is important as the risks to banking
sector stability can come from various sources
outside the traditional lending-asset price boom
paradigm. Hence, these indicators offer a direct
assessment of the default risk (or true capitalisation
in economic terms) of the banking sector.
The results in Gropp et al. (2004) imply that
one particular indicator, the distance-to-
default, is able to predict individual bank
fragility with considerable lead-time.53 It can
50 See ECB (2004c).
51 Data on interbank assets and liabilities suffers from some
shortcomings. They are non-consolidated i.e. they include
intragroup transactions. This clouds the view to actual risks
that exist between non-related banks. In addition, for full
contagion analysis, data on netting and collateral agreements
would also be needed which is currently not available.
52 See e.g. Drehmann et al. (2004), Elsinger et. al. (2004),
Virolainen (2004), Foglia et al. (2003), and Pain and Vesala
(2004).
53 Distance-to-default equals the number of asset value standard
deviations above the default point. It is calculated from
observable equity capital market value, historical equity
volatility and balance sheet leverage, using the “Merton
options pricing formula”.36
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Box 3
PROPERTIES OF MARKET INDICATORS OF DEFAULT RISK
Formal analysis of default risk varies according to the size of the entity under consideration.
For (larger) obligors having quoted securities outstanding it is possible to infer individual
default risk from observable market data, while for (smaller) obligors the analysis is by and
large constrained to traditional balance sheet analysis (e.g. credit scoring and discriminant
analysis). The main benefits of market indicators compared with balance sheet indicators is
that they are forward-looking and available at much higher frequency. This Box evaluates the
main types of market indicators available and their basic properties.
In assessing default risk, four market indicators are increasingly looked at: equity returns,
historical or implied equity volatility, corporate bond spreads, and distance-to-default. These
indicators may be evaluated for banks, other financial firms or non-financial firms, of which
banks are a special case owing to the specific characteristics of the industry.
Equity returns are typically approximated by stock price changes. Corporate bond spreads are
computed as the yield to maturity of a corporate bond minus the yield at a corresponding point on
the risk-free yield curve. Closely associated with bond spreads are credit default swaps (CDSs),
which, although different as they are based on credit derivative pricing, move very closely with
bond spreads owing to the close arbitrage between the two securities which harmonises the pricing
of credit risk. Implied volatility inverts the call option pricing formula to infer a market estimate of
the underlying volatility of the underlying asset from the observed call price. The advantage of the
implied volatility over the historical measure is that it is forward-looking. Finally, distance-to-
default (dd) can be drawn from equity market and balance sheet data using a standard Merton-
inspired structural model based on options pricing, such as that used in Moody’s KMV expected
default frequencies (EDFs). More specifically, the dd represents the number of asset-value
standard deviations that the firm is from the default point. The implied probability of default (PD)
is the point on the probability distribution corresponding to the dd. Since the implied PD (or EDF)
is a monotonic transformation of the dd, it has the same basic properties.
For market indicators to be useful as gauges of default risk, they should satisfy at least three
properties: they should be “appropriate” measures of default risk in the sense that they
correctly measure increased risk and yield easily and unambiguously interpretable signals;
they should have a high signal-to-noise ratio; and they should be sensitive to both systemic and
idiosyncratic risk. This evaluation largely draws on the standard model of firm valuation
developed by Merton and Scholes, and summarised e.g. in Merton (1990). The seminal work of
Black and Cox (1976) is drawn upon in the valuation of debt instruments.
Appropriate indicators
For an indicator to be appropriate, it must give a signal of increased default risk when:
1. the firm’s (unobservable) asset value (or earnings expectations) declines, given the face
value of debt;
2. its (unobservable) asset value (or earnings) volatility increases; and
3. its nominal level of debt grows, such that there is an increase in economic leverage.37
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banking sector In light of these properties, the stock price return is not “appropriate” since it does not satisfy
the second and third conditions. The value of equity grows when the asset risk increases, and
equity returns do not necessarily decrease as leverage increases, in line with the Modigliani-
Miller theorem, which predicts that the value of the firm is unaffected when equity is
substituted with debt. The other indicators can be shown to satisfy these properties by deriving
them from the Merton model framework.
Signal-to-noise ratio
Empirically, all market indicators produce noisy signals (see e.g. Bongini et. al., 2001). A
useful indicator of default risk should have a sufficiently high signal-to-noise ratio.
Theoretically, this is related to the efficiency of the indicator in producing a signal of increased
default risk throughout the asset quality spectrum, i.e. it should not only react very close to
default when the default risk is already very high. It can be shown that the market-based
indicators are predicted to differ with respect to the strength of their reaction to a shock moving
the firm closer to the default point. Because the value of debt is an increasing and concave
function of the asset value, V, the corporate bond spread is a convex and decreasing function of
V. This implies that the part of the spread due to credit risk remains rather stable for large
intervals of changes in V, and a significant reaction of the spread is only measurable close to
the default point. In other words, credit risk becomes a major determinant of the spread
only relatively close to default, as can be witnessed in huge jumps in spreads once market
perception has turned against the obligor. In practical terms, bond spreads are neither
easily observed nor constructed as there can be many issues with possibly conflicting signals
for the same entity or liquidity of individual issues many be too low (see Hanckock and Kwast,
2000). One complication is that corporate bond markets may be thin and illiquid, which
does not allow for the construction of indicators for a large number of firms. In addition, a
large proportion of bonds issued by firms may have option features, such as the right to call
the bond. It has been shown that spreads may be difficult to compare, even for different issues
of a single firm.
The non-linear property of spreads in capturing default risk is in contrast to the dd, and thus
also the implied PD, which are direct default risk indicators and show a reaction that is also
much further away from default over the entire asset quality spectrum. This greater leading
property of the signal is also supported by empirical research. On the other hand, the main
limitation of the volatility measures (either historical or implied) in terms of noise in their
information is that they are erratic unless very strong smoothing methods are used, whose
selection is basically ad hoc. In addition, the horizon of the implied volatility is the same as the
time to maturity of the call option, which may be rather short, whereas in the implied PD
calculation this can be adjusted (as per Moody’s KMV). A further issue is that its observance
depends on call options actually being adequately traded on firm stocks, which is often not the
case.
Sensitivity to all drivers of risk
Finally, indicators of default risk should reflect all relevant factors affecting the risk, i.e. both
systematic and idiosyncratic ones. Nevertheless, when aggregating indicators or extracting
systemic information from firm-level indicators, the importance of the idiosyncratic factors
could decline. Although more research could be usefully conducted on this point, there is38
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already some evidence that bond spreads largely reflect changes in systemic market factors,
while dd and implied PD also capture idiosyncratic factors (see Hoggarth, 2001). This could be
related to the feature that bond spreads react relatively little to credit risk changes, unless they
are close to default.
Overall assessment
On the basis of the above considerations and empirical evidence, the two most promising
indicators are potentially bond spreads/CDSs and dd/implied PD (see Tudela and Young, 2003,
and Vassalou and Xing, 2002). The second family of indicators has in general higher leading
properties: it appropriately reflects default risk everywhere in the asset quality spectrum; it
therefore promises to have a reasonable signal-to-noise ratio, which is the best among the
alternatives; and it should reflect both systematic and idiosyncratic risk factors. At the same
time, bond spreads/CDSs should not be overlooked as a complementary source of information,
because they signal the risk of default very clearly closer to the moment of default, possibly
more so than dd, and can thus be powerful “red flags”. For banks, the expectation of external
financial support can dilute the responsiveness of bond spreads, but the dd should always
reflect the default risk factors irrespective of this caveat for bond spreads. There is empirical
evidence that this hypothesis holds true for European banks (see Gropp et. al., 2004) and for
U.S. banks (see Krainer and Lopez, 2003).
also be shown that the indicator has appropriate
and desirable theoretical features to function as
an explicit default risk indicator (see Box 3).
One might be able, through aggregating the
indicators for individual banks, to obtain a
useful indicator for the entire banking system (or
more precisely the group of large banks, for
which equity prices can be obtained). While the
individual distances-to-defaults reflect a
combination of idiosyncratic and systemic risk,
the aggregation, as long as it is done across a
sufficient number of banks, should remove the
idiosyncratic component of risk.54 The available
sample, which is determined by the availability
of equity prices in the EU, consists of some 40
banks. While relative to the population of banks
these numbers seem small, their market share is
above 50% of total banking system assets in
almost all EU countries.
The asset-weighted and the simple average
distance-to-default indicators are used regularly
to monitor banking system stability in the ECB
macro-prudential analysis (see Chart 6). The two
indicators move together for most of the sample
period. However, the asset-weighted distance-
to-default is consistently below the simple
average, suggesting that larger banks were
weaker. Conceptually, weighting by assets
makes some sense, as in the spirit of Borio
(2003), the analysis should focus on assets “at
risk,” rather than number of banks “at risk”. The
indicators have also been found to react strongly
at the time of the Russia default/LTCM crisis
and the attacks of September 11.
Even more closely corresponding to Borio’s
(2003) notion of “setting acceptable tail losses
for the portfolio as whole”, one can plot the
proportion of banking assets (or banks) that are
below a certain threshold distance to default (see
Chart 7).55 Using such “threshold indicators”
may significantly improve the precision of the
54 While this is true, if there is contagion, the aggregated
indicator will reflect cases, in which individual banks are
hit by an idiosyncratic shock, which then is transmitted
(through e.g. money market or payment system exposures, or
ownership links) to other banks. In fact, one potential use of
market indicators may be to use them to detect such links (see
Gropp and Moerman, 2004, and Gropp and Vesala, 2004).
55 One should interpret the following as x% of large publicly
traded banks’ assets are below a certain threshold. See also
ECB (2003).39
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banking sector signal on the fragility of the banking system. For
instance, the proportion of banking assets below
investment grade quality (threshold less than
2.71) was increasing in the year before Russia’s
default. After Russia’s default, the increase
quickened, reaching a peak of around 90% of
assets from November 1998 to September 1999.
The decline during the following several months
is equally steep as the ascent.56
In addition to the distance-to-default (and its
variants), the regularly monitored market
indicators include banks’ subordinated bond and
credit default swap spreads. These indicators
provide usefully complementary views to the
distance-to-default. However, analyses suggest
that spreads in particular may be much less
suited as systemic indicators of bank fragility
(see Box 3). The signals have been substantially
more volatile and they tend to be lagging the
systemic events identified above. This could
reflect the fact that the pricing of bonds reflects
many other factors than default risk, such as
liquidity conditions, especially far away from
the default point. Pricing in bank bond markets
may also be affected by changes in conditions in
overall corporate bond markets, which makes
the interpretation of the signals difficult.
Finally, banks’ ratings (both normal bond
ratings and “financial strength ratings”,
measuring the financial condition of banks
irrespective of any forthcoming support from
the government) are regularly reviewed in the
banking sector stability analysis. This also
includes a review of rating outlooks and the
reports offered by rating agencies.
6.2 STRESS TESTING SYSTEMS’ SENSITIVITY
While indicators based on market information
provide a view of the full set of risks faced by
banks, they suffer from the downside that they
reflect the most likely outcome in the near
future. Consequently, assessment of the
sensitivity of banks’ operations to severe
shocks with low probability of realisation, but
high costs will have to be conducted separately.
Stress testing is a useful tool to test
how a realisation of numerous adverse
disturbances simultaneously would affect
banks’ performance.57 Different scenarios can
be produced either based on historical or
invented events. The system can be shocked
using different combinations of disturbances.
However, it would be preferable to have a clear
56 We have conducted similar analyses for spreads but found that
spreads may be much less suited as systemic indicators of
bank fragility. The signals were substantially more volatile
and they tend to be lagging the events that we have identified.
57 For general references to the development of stress testing
tools see Jones et al. (2004) and Drehmann et al. (2004).
Chart 6 Distance-to-default of 37 large EU
banks (Jan. 1998 – Sep. 2004)
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Chart 7 Threshold indicators based on
distance-to-default of 37 large EU banks
(Jan. 1998-Sep. 2004)
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plausible relationship between disturbances,
based on actual links between different factors,
rather than produce ad hoc scenarios which
cannot, in reality, take place.
A separate question is how the impact of a
combination of disturbances is transmitted to
the banking system and how it travels within
the system. Eventually, the aim of the analysis
is to assess if banks’ solvency positions would
weaken, following the combination of shocks,
to the extent that they would threaten financial
stability. In addition, drastic liquidity squeeze
in the banking system would also be considered
as a sign of financial instability, owing to the
important liquidity-provisioning role of banks.
Stress testing the materialisation of a number
of different risks is currently quite demanding
in the context of a large financial system, such
as the EU. The major constraint is usually
the lack of detailed data. Comparable,
homogenous indicators on, for example,
interest rate risk are still under development,
while liquidity and contagion risks would
require detailed information on interbank
markets, which is usually confidential, limiting
the scope and usefulness of stress testing
within the banking system to a large extent.
Meaningful analysis would also require
relatively long time series, which are not
available on banks. Owing to these
shortcomings, credit risk is still the usual
candidate for stress testing.
A “bottom-up” approach to stress testing is to
ask banks to run impact studies of specific
scenarios on their portfolio outcomes, using
their own stress testing tools . This approach is
followed e.g. by the IMF in its financial sector
assessments (see Jones et. al. 2004). The “top-
down” approach runs models at the aggregated
level, which are aimed at quantifying the link
between macroeconomic and financial market
variables and banks’ financial condition and
enabling the conduct of analyses of the
sensitivity of banks’ condition to changes in
these variables.
The traditional approach to establish the link
between macroeconomic variables and banks’
asset quality indicators is the “single equation
approach”, which estimates a model regressing
banks’ loan loss provisions (or non-performing
loans) on macroeconomic and other variables.58
Box 4 describes the model used at the ECB to
link banks’ loan loss provisions to
macroeconomic variables. While this analysis
can produce useful first estimates of high-level
aggregated relations, the results so far indicate
a relatively weak or quantitatively small
link between provisions and macroeconomic
developments. These results could be due to the
fact that the nature of the link between default
risk and the business cycle is not necessarily
straightforward. It is not clear that models, which
Box 4
LOAN LOSS PROVISIONING IN THE EU OVER THE BUSINESS CYCLE
Loan loss provisioning (LLP) by banks often tends to increase during recessions and to
decrease during expansions (Chart A). This can create pro-cyclicality in banks’ earnings,
which may entail undesirable macroeconomic consequences, for example, leading to credit
rationing when economic conditions deteriorate, thereby possibly aggravating economic
downturns. As can be seen from Charts B to D, provisions (as a percent of total lending volume)
move negatively with EU GDP growth and with the spread between long and short-term
interest rates, and positively with the real interest rate.
58 See Greenawalt and Sinkey (1991), de Lis et al. (2001), Pain
(2003), and Bikker and Metzemakers (2004).41
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This Box reports the summary results of an empirical study on loan loss provisioning (LLP) of
the EU-15 countries’ banking sectors and of major individual EU banks.
In order to shed light on loan loss provisioning policies, the effects and relative importance of
macroeconomic, financial market and behavioural (bank or sector-specific) factors can be
tested. The LLP of the EU-15 countries’ banking sectors were analysed econometrically over
the period 1979-2001, considering several variables. Among the variables included were the
EU-wide and country-specific GDP growth rates, the EU short-term real interest rate and the
EU term spread, as well as the country or bank-specific lending growth, capital ratio and
income margin.
The results of the empirical analysis suggest an increase in LLP of about 10 basis points
following a 1% decrease in the EU GDP growth rate. A rise in short-term real rates of 100 basis
Chart A EU-wide LLP (% loans, % income) Chart B EU-wide LLP and real GDP growth
Chart C EU-wide LLP and EU short-term real
rate
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start off by choosing specific macroeconomic
variables as driving factors, will uncover the
“true model”. There might be some other
common factors, which induce correlation
across firms’ default risk, but which do not affect
observable macroeconomic factors, or do so only
very weakly. In fact, there is no apparent
consensus in the broader literature linking
default risk indicators directly to macroeconomic
variables.
Secondly, as noted by Altman and Saunders, it is
important to distinguish ex post realisations
of credit problems from changes in the ex ante
loss distribution arising from different
macroeconomic conditions. Exhibit 4 illustrates
this issue. If point A is a bad ex post realisation
on a stable loss distribution 1, then the ex ante
risk exposure is not affected by systematic risk
factors. If, however the amount of loss is
represented by point B on loss distribution 1
during good economic times and point A on loss
distribution 2 during bad economic times, then
there is an ex ante pro-cyclical shift in risk
exposure. That is, the entire distribution of
losses shifts in response to macroeconomic
factors. Since point A lies on both loss
distributions, it is empirically difficult to
disentangle ex ante shifts in risk from mere
ex post realisations. To address this identification
problem ideally requires a forward-looking
indicator of default tendency, as opposed to one
points tends to be followed by a rise in LLP of 10 basis points in the following year. A 25 basis
points reduction tends to occur when the term spread increases by 100 basis points, possibly
reflecting an improving GDP growth outlook.
In a next stage, the model can be used to analyse the sensitivity of average LLP to different
levels of the explanatory variables (see the table below). For example, a scenario of 1% growth
at the EU level, a long-term interest rate of 4% and a term spread of 2%, as of late 2002, implies
average LLP of 0.95%. If the long-term interest rate were to increase by 200 basis points,
ceteris paribus, LLP would increase by 16 basis points to 1.11%. Similarly, a weakening of
economic growth to 0% would, ceteris paribus, increase LLP by 10 basis points to 1.05%.
Yield spread Long-term EU real GDP growth (%)
 (%) interest rate (%) -2 -1 0 1 2
02 1.77 1.66 1.56 1.45 1.35
4 1.93 1.83 1.72 1.62 1.51
6 2.09 1.99 1.88 1.78 1.68
8 2.25 2.15 2.05 1.95 1.85
12 1.43 1.33 1.22 1.12 1.01
4 1.59 1.49 1.38 1.28 1.18
6 1.75 1.65 1.55 1.45 1.34
8 1.91 1.81 1.71 1.61 1.51
22 1.09 0.99 0.89 0.78 0.67
4 1.25 1.15 1.05 0.95 0.84
6 1.41 1.32 1.21 1.11 1.01
8 1.57 1.48 1.38 1.28 1.17
32 0.76 0.65 0.55 0.44 0.34
4 0.92 0.82 0.71 0.61 0.50
6 1.08 0.98 0.88 0.78 0.67
8 1.24 1.14 1.04 0.94 0.84
Level of loan loss provisions (% of loans) under different macroeconomic and financial market
developments
Source: ECB.
Note: The figures denote scenarios for LLP given the 2002 figures for lending growth = 2.7%, capital/asset ratio = 4.6%, income
margin = 0.9%.43
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based on actual loss experience such as loan loss
provisions (or realised defaults). It is then possible
to assess whether the likelihood of default is
materially affected by different macroeconomic
conditions.
The VAR-model developed at the ECB, linking
Moody’s KMVs EDFs with macroeconomic
variables, follows this idea, as EDFs are
forward-looking default risk indicators (see
Alves, 2004 and ECB, 2003b). This analysis at
the industry level also allows to sharpen the
analysis compared with the aggregated “single
equation approach”, as it loses less information
through aggregation. It also incorporates
correlations between borrower sectors and
industries, which is an important part of the
stress testing of credit exposures. If adequate
breakdowns of loan losses or other indicators on
default probability of different industries and
sectors are not available, correlations between
industries to various shocks are not possible to
estimate. In this case, rough approximations can
be achieved by studying how aggregate loan
losses are impacted by a combination of
disturbances.59 Further work is ongoing in
addressing the co-movement of sectoral risks
and effects of credit portfolio diversification by
resorting in developing stress testing to credit
risk modelling approaches (see Pain and Vesala,
2004).
7 STATISTICAL ISSUES IN THE
COMPILATION  OF MPIs
7.1 INTRODUCTION
As noted in Section 3, the MPIs are divided into
three subsets of indicators: 1) internal factors,
2) external factors and 3) contagion factors (see
Exhibit 3). The statistical requirements in the
field of macroprudential analysis are addressed
through combining the use of existing available
data drawn from EU harmonised monetary
statistics (and other macroeconomic statistics)
with supervisory and commercial data sources.
Some of the harmonised monetary statistics are
adapted for the purpose of macro-prudential
Exhibit 4  Two credit loss distributions
analysis and the transmission of these data by
NCBs to the ECB is reflected in an ECB
Guideline, which is addressed to  euro area
NCBs.60
Currently, the production of a number of MPIs
is derived from the existing prudential
supervision collection systems, guided by the
EU regulatory framework, most importantly
the Bank Account Directive (BAD). The
advantage of this approach is that it is
straightforward in terms of cost-effectiveness
and relevance for financial stability purposes.
The data collection from supervisory
authorities is based on information that was
originally designed to assess the condition of
individual institutions rather than with the
intention of consistently collecting data
suitable for aggregation. This is contrary to
data collected in the macroeconomic field,
which is based on rigorous statistical
requirements that are developed over a long
period of time with a focus to aggregation of
data into long time series.
Given the rapid development in the macro-
prudential analysis, the related statistical
requirements are being further improved,
in particular the data quality aspects. The
data quality needed to effectively support the
policy makers has several dimensions
59 See e.g. ECB (2003b), Box 3.
60 See the Guideline ECB/2003/2, as amended.
loss distribution 1
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(concerning timeliness, coverage, reliability,
comparability, accessibility, etc.) that need to
be carefully assessed.61
In the following, the data sources of the various
MPIs are reviewed. The following Sections 8
and 9 then provide an overview of data quality
aspects of the MPIs currently collected in the
ESCB context, outline the way forward to
overcome remaining problems as well as
discuss the development of indicators for
financial stability purposes in other foras.
7.2 DATA SOURCES
As shown in Exhibit 5, most MPIs are compiled
either from national supervisory sources or
through harmonised macroeconomic statistical
sources. The number of market-based
indicators is still relatively low but it is
constantly growing.
DATA ITEM SOURCE2) NOTES
I. INTERNAL FACTORS
1. Profitability, balance sheet quality, capital SUP Transmitted through statistical channels and
adequacy stored in a statistical database




2. Demand and supply (competitive) conditions STAT
3. Risk concentrations SUP/STAT
Credit growth and sectoral concentration SUP/STAT STAT except commercial mortgage lending
Currency and maturity structure of domestic STAT
lending
Global credit exposures SUP
Liquidity risk STAT
Exposure of EU15 to new EU member countries STAT
Exposures towards emerging and developing country STAT BIS framework
4. Market assessment of risks SUP/MKT SUP: eg. no. of bank rating downgrades in period,
distance to default measures
MKT: eg. Datastream
II. EXTERNAL FACTORS
5. Financial fragility STAT/SUP/ STAT: Financial Accounts.
MKT SUP: Admin. National data
MKT: KMV EDF
6. Asset price developments MKT Commercial providers e.g. Datastream.
For real estate prices, patchy data from BIS.
Most sources of private statistics with different
concepts.
7. Cyclical and monetary conditions STAT Balance sheet items / Financial Accounts / HICP
III. CONTAGION FACTORS
8. Contagion factors STAT/SUP STAT: share of interbank liabilities
SUP: large exposures
1) For a complete list, see Exhibit 3.
2) STAT= harmonised statistical data sources; SUP = national supervisory data sources; MKT = commercial data providers;
HICP = Harmonised index of consumer prices. BIS = Bank for International Settlements. KMV EDF = Expected default frequencies
of KMV
Exhibit 5  Data sources of macro-prudential indicators1)
61 For background information on data quality frameworks, see
OECD (2003) and the IMF data quality reference site (http://
dsbb.imf.org/Applications/web/dqrs/dqrshome/)45
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A large number of MPIs is compiled by
aggregation of national supervisory series. In
particular, MPIs on profitability, balance sheet
quality and capital adequacy (so-called
“consolidated banking data”) represent one of
the key tools of the analysis. For this data set,
the underlying definitions of most variables
describing banks financial condition are drawn
from the BAD. Consolidated own funds data
(Tier 1 equity capital and supplementary Tier 2
capital) and the solvency ratios follow the
supervisory standards as stipulated by the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and
introduced in the EU via the specific
Directives. The current international
accounting principles for asset and liability
valuations are used, i.e. traded financial assets
and liabilities are recorded at marked to
market (or “fair”) value, while non-traded
assets and liabilities are recorded at historical
cost. Since most of the series are collected not
only as aggregates but also broken down into
three size groups (large, medium and small
credit institutions), the total number of the
series is large.
The consolidated banking data are collected
through a full set of income statement and
balance sheet information (i.e. the underlying
values rather than ratios). This enables the
users to compute those indicators deemed most
useful for the analysis and to use a large variety
of different ratios. Hence, even though the used
set of indicators may vary, the core data
remains roughly stable. This approach
minimises the reporting burden and improves
the availability of long time series.
This data set is collected on an annual
frequency, with reference to the situation as at
end-December, starting from end-May of the
following year. The timeliness is not strictly
fixed as it depends on national data availability
constraints. The reporting population for
consolidated banking data consists of all EU-
registered credit institutions (CIs). The
coverage of the reporting population is
comprehensive, close to 100%. The data are
transmitted to the ECB through statistical
channels and stored in a statistical database.
Amongst harmonised macroeconomic data
sources, money and banking statistics (MBS)
also provide an important contribution.
MBS is a statistical framework designed for the
analysis of monetary developments in the euro
area on the basis of balance sheet information
of the so-called “money-issuing sector”.62 This
framework consists of three main elements:
1) a definition of which institutions are to
provide balance sheet data; 2) the method
of aggregation and consolidation of the
information and 3) a specification of the
data breakdowns to be delivered. Concerning
the first element, the Monetary Financial
Institutions (MFIs) have been identified as the
reporting population for MBS. Concerning the
second element, the aggregated balance sheet
of the MFI sector is the sum of the harmonised
balance sheets of all the MFIs resident in the
euro area. The consolidated balance sheet of
the MFI sector is obtained by netting the
aggregated balance sheet positions between
MFIs in the euro area. The consolidated
balance sheet provides the basis for the regular
analysis of euro area monetary aggregates and
counterparts. Concerning the last element, the
balance sheet information is broken down by
instrument, (original) maturity and sector.63
Some of the MBS data are specifically adapted
for macro-prudential analysis. Two main data
sets can be separately identified: the balance
sheet data on credit institutions (Area 3) and the
62 The money-issuing sector  consists of those financial
institutions (termed ‘Monetary Financial Institutions’ or
MFIs) which issue liabilities with a high degree of moneyness
to non-MFIs located in the euro area (excluding central
government). MFIs are central banks, resident credit
institutions as defined in Community law, and other resident
financial institutions whose business is to receive deposits
and/or close substitutes for deposits from entities other than
MFIs and, for their own account (at least in economic terms),
to grant credits and/or make investments in securities. (See
also www.ecb.int/stats/pdf/money/mfi/mfi_definitions.pdf)
63 For background information on the three main elements of
MBS, see Bull (2004).46
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bank retail interest rates (Area 2).64 The first data
set has been produced through the development
of a reporting scheme specifically designed to
cover balance sheet statistics that NCBs already
collect from CIs as a sub-set of the MFI
population65 under the statistical Regulation
ECB/2001/13. Data on credit institutions are
currently separately reported to the ECB by
those Member States where the population of
money market funds (MMFs) is significant.
Stock and flow data are reported at a quarterly
frequency, with a timeliness of 28 working days.
The second MBS data set required for macro-
prudential analysis concerns bank retail
interest rates (Area 2).66 For macro-prudential
purposes, this data is used for instance to
calculate the overall margin for the main
business of banks, i.e. the spread between
deposit taking activity and lending. Until
recently, the provision of retail interest rate
data had followed an approach based on already
existing but unharmonised national interest
rate statistics (RIR data), which suffered from
some limitations. However, by means of a
dedicated Regulation, the ECB is now
collecting harmonised statistics on interest
rates applied by MFIs (MIR). With these
statistics, the macro-prudential analysis is
exploiting comparable and accurate data on
both new business and outstanding amounts.
Harmonised macroeconomic statistics are also
used to compile MPIs concerning the external
factors. In particular, financial fragility
indicators (area 5) rely on MBS as well as
on financial accounts statistics.67 Moreover,
indicators on cyclical and monetary conditions
(area 7) include macro economic indicators
such as the rate of real GDP growth, the rate
of change in M2, corporate and household
indebtedness.
Forward looking MPIs, information on the set
of large EU banks as well as data on general
financial market developments are obtained
from commercial and publicly available data
sources. Market data is very important for the
analysis as it provides means to assess banks’
income generation dependent on financial
market developments (both trading and
investment books) as well as asset quality
(investment book). It also provides a view to
market expectations and the key forward
looking elements in assessing banks’ ability to
withstand disturbances (see discussion above
on market indicators).
7.3 CONSOLIDATION CONCEPTS
When banking data are collected for financial
stability purposes, it is increasingly recognised
that a fully consolidated approach is needed,
implying consolidation of all relevant cross-
border and cross-sector operations of banking
groups. Exhibit 6 below, drawn from the IMF
Compilation Guide on Financial Soundness
Indicators (FSIs), provides a schematic
presentation of levels of consolidation in terms
of control and domestic versus cross-border
orientation of deposit taking institutions.68 The
consolidation approach recommended by the
IMF is the so-called “domestically controlled,
cross-border consolidated data”, which is in
line with the so-called “home country”
principle (i.e. including foreign branches
according to the residency of the parent
companies) (blocks 1a, b, and c in Exhibit 6).
The home country principle is reflected in the
division of responsibilities of banking entities
between supervisory authorities in home and
host countries according to the First Banking
Co-ordination Directive. However, it should be
noted that the IMF approach only covers
deposit-taking institutions and excludes other
64 The two data sets are used also for other purposes. For
example, the first data set is used by Eurostat to complement
its financial services statistics.
65 The MFI balance sheet data are not sufficient for the purposes
of macro-prudential analysis for those countries where the
reporting population of other MFIs consists of both credit
institutions and money market funds (MMFs) and where the
impact of the latter is significant. The reporting scheme for
credit institutions is currently included in annex V of the MBS
Guideline ECB/2003/2, as amended.
66 This data set is needed, in the first instance, for monetary
policy purposes, e.g. for monitoring the transmission
mechanism.
67 On the use of financial accounts data, see Sahel and Vesala
(2001) and Mink and Silva (2003).
68 The IMF FSI Guide is further described in Section 9.47
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financial institutions belonging to a banking
group.
To accommodate the need for full coverage of
risks for the purpose of the ESCB macro-
prudential analysis, the consolidation is broader
than the one recommended by the IMF as it
includes cross sector consolidation (not shown
in the Exhibit), i.e. subsidiaries of deposit taking
institutions in other financial sectors, excluding
the insurance sector.
Profitability ratios (e.g. ROE), growth in
banks’ credit exposures and liquidity, banks’
off-balance-sheet activities (credit lines,
derivatives),69 banks’ overall exposures by
specific industry sectors are examples of
indicators to be monitored on a consolidated
basis. Consequently, an important set of MPIs
is based on consolidated banking data from
national supervisory authorities.
In the context of the ESCB, cross-border cross-
sector consolidated data are reported to the
ECB by the responsible home supervisory
authority (or the central bank) of the parent
bank. All EU countries are presently able to
provide fully cross-border consolidated
banking sector data for the ECB macro-
prudential analysis and significant efforts have
been made to avoid double counting and have
clean EU-wide aggregates.70 In particular, the
objective is that data on foreign branches and
subsidiaries are reported only once by the home
country authority of the parent company and
not by the host countries of these institutions in
order to avoid double counting.
Cross-sector consolidation follows from the
same principle as cross-border consolidation.
Full view to all risks faced by a bank requires
information of important activities conducted
Exhibit 6 Schematic presentation of levels of consolidation
Source: IMF.
69 This data collection has been recently refined to include data
on few core off-balance sheet items from credit risk
perspective (off-balance sheet items are broken down into
contingent liabilities, commitments and derivatives).
70 This applies also to the New Member States (NMS). After a
transition phase (year 2004), they start reporting consolidated
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in the non-bank financial institutions, which
are part of the banking group. Preferably, risks
in “bancassurance” structures should also be
included, though owing to differences in
national practices this is not fully the case at
the moment in the context of the ESCB.
Progress is underway to implement full cross-
sector consolidation, the insurance sector
providing the biggest obstacles, as banking
groups do no yet consolidate their insurance
operations in the EU.
The macro-prudential analysis also makes
extensive use of the harmonised macroeconomic
statistics (e.g. MBS) collected on a non-
consolidated basis for “domestic economy”
(Blocks 1a, 2a and 3 of Exhibit 6) as described in
the previous sections. These data allow for
addressing risks in specific geographic regions
and countries, and to identify possible financial
imbalances causing risks to banking sector
stability. These statistics are based exclusively
on the so-called “host country” principle.71
The reporting population for monetary policy
purposes comprises 1) institutions incorporated
and located in the territory, including resident
subsidiaries of those parent companies that are
located outside that territory and 2) resident
branches of institutions that have their head
office outside that territory.
7.4 LEVELS, DIFFERENCES AND MEASURES
FOR DATA DISPERSION
Quantitative data should be constructed to
include information on changes over time as
well as the levels of the key indicators. From
the point of view of the stability analysis,
which is conjunctural in nature, indicators are
often presented as changes rather than as levels
as they can be directly linked to the dynamics
of the rest of the economy.
In order to calculate accurate data on changes,
the simple comparison of end-of-period levels
is not always sufficient. Indeed, in the case of
MPIs based on consolidated balance sheet or
assets quality information, the levels may
change due e.g. to price or foreign exchange
revaluations, rather than to new business. In
principle, data on the actual new business (flow
data) that has occurred during the period would
be needed as this would permit a better
representation of the difference in levels
brought about by the acquisition of financial
assets or the incurance of financial liabilities.
Alternatively, flow data can be calculated by
adjusting the difference between end-of-period
levels for the effect of non-transactions-related
factors. For MBS purposes, for instance, the
latter option is followed.
Flow data on consolidated banking data are
currently not available. Therefore, the ECB
calculates growth rates on the basis of
differences in stocks. However, work to
improve the MPIs is ongoing. For instance, a
standard adjustment for exchange rate changes
should be possible. As and when data
availability improves, flow data should be
derived from reclassifications, revaluations
and other adjustments. Revaluations arise
from changes in the price and/or foreign
exchange rates of the underlying financial asset
or liability. Reclassifications include any
business relating to CIs that have been
classified to a different size class compared to
the previous observation or to CIs that join/
leave the population. For off-balance sheet
variables, only reclassifications data would be
required, as it is assumed that these items are
recorded at nominal value (e.g. guarantees) or
at notional value (e.g. derivatives).
In addition to aggregate system wide data, the
ECB collects data enabling analysis on
national banking sectors. Information on
foreign controlled institutions operating in a
country enables to have a view to possible
differences in performance between domestic
and foreign banks. Aggregating data on
foreign-controlled branches/subsidiaries with
data on domestic banks also enables analysis
on the national banking markets. This is
particularly important in the EU where the
71 According to this principle, a resident MFI means an MFI that
is resident in the economic territory of a given country.49
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integration process between banking systems is
still ongoing and hence aggregate data may
hide large differences between countries. It
should be noted that country-specific
information is important from the system
stability point of view, particularly when it
reflects the conditions of major, systemically
important institutions in the EU. Information
on the distributions of some key variables is
also collected to assess the dispersion around
the averages.
The size groups improve the analysis of
dispersion within the banking system and allow
better identification of fragilities in the
banking sector. The size groups are defined as
follows: banks with total assets over 0.5% of
total consolidated EU banking sector assets are
considered large whereas small banks have
assets less than 0.005% of total consolidated
EU banking sector assets. The flexible
definition based on relative rather than
absolute size allows for the asset growth in the
banking sector and ensures that e.g. the group
of large banks continuously captures the major
institutions. It also avoids large structural
breaks in the data over time.
As noted above, in addition to aggregate
information and size groups, individual
publicly available financial statement data are
also collected separately on the largest EU
banks. This information is normally available
in a more timely manner than the banking
system-wide data and complements that
information by enabling detailed analysis for
the best and worst performing institutions.
8 INTEGRATION OF INFORMATION FROM
DIFFERENT DATA SOURCES
This Section reviews some remaining
statistical issues regarding the integration of
data sources for macro-prudential analysis.
These issues concern 1) the combined use of
financial macro-statistics and aggregated
micro-prudential data; 2) differences in the
underlying reporting systems; and 3) the
differences between the frameworks in terms of
coverage, residency principle, consolidation
rules and maturity concepts. Finally, the main
challenges ahead are summarised.
8.1 THE COMBINED USE OF DIFFERENT
SOURCES OF STATISTICAL INFORMATION
As described above, the sources of statistical
information used for the purpose of prudential
supervision at the macro level can be divided
into two categories: financial macro-statistics
and aggregated micro-prudential data. As
macro-prudential analysis needs to cover a
large variety of issues, it is natural that
different sources of data are used, which can
also be compiled on different statistical bases.
When data from the different sources are used
for different purposes (and not used to
calculate single ratios, for instance), this does
not necessarily hamper the analysis. However,
improved consistency between different
sources, enabling the calculation of ratios
using different data sets, would allow a more
effective, easier and wider use of the
information.
Financial macro-statistics comprise harmonised
frameworks (MBS, Financial Accounts,
Balance of Payments) where data are organised
into comprehensive overviews of the condition
and transactions of the financial sector and
its key components. These data can thus
provide indicators of the activity and operation
of the financial system as a whole.72
Aggregated micro-prudential data, in turn,
consists of mostly supervisory information on
the condition of individual banks. These
aggregations may provide indications of the
overall condition of the financial sector. As
such, aggregated micro-prudential data may
suffer from limitations in terms of statistical
accuracy and international comparability,
which may limit their use.
Although both financial macro-statistics and
micro-prudential data are drawn from similar
72 See  IMF (April 2000).50
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sources, differences between their compilation
methods can impair the joint use of these data
sets to calculate single indicators.73 It is
important to have available metadata that
carefully explain the definitions and possible
limitations in the data set referred to.74
The comparability of micro-prudential data can
be improved through adherence to
internationally agreed supervisory, statistical
and accounting standards. In fact, both
financial macro-statistics and aggregated
micro-prudential data are derived from
individual banks’ balance sheets and other
detailed financial information. The two types
of data can be integrated in two directions.
Integration could, firstly, be achieved by
applying standard statistical concepts (such as
definitions of residency, sectors, and financial
instruments) when compiling aggregate micro-
prudential data. It could also be achieved
by enhancing financial macro-statistics with
additional breakdowns of MIR and MFI
balance sheet statistics (such as memo items
on non-performing loans, syndicated loans,
sector exposures and subordinated debt), as
well as with timely, detailed and harmonised
data on banks’ consolidated balance sheets,
profitability and capital adequacy.
Convergence in supervisory practices will
provide benefits to the compilation of MPIs
which are comparable cross-border, besides
leading to more cost-effective reporting by
financial institutions. In the EU, the
convergence in supervisory practices is in
particular facilitated by the establishment of
specific supervisory committees within the
so-called “Lamfalussy framework”. The
involvement of central banks in this process
can also potentially contribute to the overall
consistency of the various reporting
requirements for both supervisory and
monetary policy purposes.
At the country level, where an NCB is also the
competent national authority in the field of
banking prudential supervision, it is more
likely to maintain a single integrated reporting
system between monetary statistics and
supervisory returns. Hence, in these countries,
the integration of the two data sets is
facilitated, also at the level of the reporting
population, since consolidated banking data
may be collected from well-identified
reporting agents that normally represent a
subset of the MFI list. This may allow
articulating more easily the consolidated
balance sheet formats of these reporting agents
within the MBS balance sheet format or in
separate modules but linked through
consistency checks. Suitably integrated or at
least compatible reporting requirements could
also minimise the reporting burden of banks.
Exhibit 7 below summarises the main
differences amongst national statistical and
supervisory collection systems and the degree
of independence between statistical and
financial accounting rules. The cost-
effectiveness increases from right to left and
statistical dependence on financial accounting
rules from bottom to top.
8.2 MAIN DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MONETARY
AND SUPERVISORY DATA
ECB financial macro-statistics are primarily
designed for monetary policy purposes. As
mentioned above, the statistical requirements
in the field of monetary policy (including those
needed for operational purposes) have been
prioritised against other requirements. These
monetary data are therefore tailored to specific
needs and do not always meet the requirements
for macro-prudential analysis. The differences
between the requirements for macro-prudential
analysis and those for monetary policy
purposes are summarised in Exhibit 8 below.75
73 For instance, profitability indicators such as RoE (Return on
Equity = net profit/capital & reserves) and RoA (Return on
Assets = net profit/total assets) cannot be calculated using the
balance sheet figures from the existing monetary statistics
(MBS data), since they are unconsolidated and follow the host
country approach, while the profit figures are consolidated
and follow the home country approach.
74 See, for instance,  Wharmby (2001) and Debbage (2002) for
discussion of possible inconsistencies.
75 This table represents a further elaboration of the one
presented in Grande and Stubbe (2002).51
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Concerning the requirements in terms of
geographical coverage, while for monetary
policy purposes the focus is on the euro area,
macro-prudential analyses covers both the euro
area and the EU. The reporting population for
financial macro statistics consists only of
monetary financial institutions (MFIs i.e.
mainly credit institutions and money market
funds). This differs from the view of micro and
macro-prudential analysis. Here the focus is
broader. The full view to banking risks requires
that the business of non-bank subsidiaries of
banking groups is covered, including insurance
companies. These entities currently fall outside
the scope of the reference population for
monetary policy purposes. In addition, contrary
Requirement Monetary policy purposes Prudential supervision purposes
Geographical Coverage Euro area EU/euro area
Reporting population Monetary Financial Institutions (and Credit Institutions and other financial
OFIs other than insurance companies institutions belonging to a group (or subgroup)
and pension funds) controlled by a Credit Institution
Reporting coverage 95% minimum (de minimis threshold); As close as possible to 100%
data grossed up to 100%
Residency Host country approach Primarily home country approach complemented with
host country approach
Geographical Unconsolidated Primarily consolidated complemented with
consolidation unconsolidated
Institutional Unconsolidated1) Consolidated, including other financial institutions
consolidation belonging to the same group.
Valuation Market value Market value/book value
Instrument Basic (currency, deposits, debt Detailed (e.g. syndicated loans, subordinated
Breakdown securities, MMF shares, capital, debt, e-business, etc.)
remaining liabilities)
Maturity Original maturity Residual maturity
Exhibit 8 Main differences between statistical requirements for monetary policy vs.
supervisory purposes
1) Consolidation is however permitted under certain conditions within the national territory, hence an MFI can, for statistical
reporting purposes, consolidate its domestic offices, but not its offices located outside the country.
Source: ECB’s Statistics Committee.
Exhibit 7 Integration of collection either systems and dependence on commercial accounting
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Local accounting rules BE, ES, FR, IE, IT, FI, DE  LU, NL, PT
used in statistics SE, UK
Of which adjustments BE, FR, FI, UK
applied to meet
statistical requirements
Separate valuation rules GR  AT, DK
for statistical purposes52
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to monetary policy analysis, disaggregation in
terms of size of an institution is often used in
macro-prudential analysis as large institutions
are systemically important.
As mentioned above, one major difference
between the two data sets results from the
applied institutional and geographical
consolidation criteria. For monetary/
operational purposes, data are made available
on an unconsolidated basis (i.e. all intra-MFI
business should be reported on a gross basis,
without netting out, including the business of
an MFI with its foreign branches) and follow
the host country principle.76 This host country
data can be useful when tracking sources of risk
that emanate from a certain country. However,
these data can only complement, but not
substitute, the full cross-border and cross-
sector consolidated data which is key for
macro-prudential analysis (see Section 7.3).
Another difference lies in the degree of detail
of the balance sheet instrument breakdown,
which is much greater in the supervisory
statistics, reflecting the need to monitor the
risk, liquidity and capital adequacy profiles of
the individual supervised entities. This is also
needed in macro-prudential analysis.
Finally, in terms of the maturity concept, while
for monetary/operational purposes data should
be broken down by original maturity, an
analysis of the liquidity condition of banks
from a micro and macro-prudential perspective
requires breakdowns by residual maturity.77
8.3 CHALLENGES AHEAD
Although the supervisory data pooled so far for
the ESCB macro-prudential analysis are the
best available in terms of timeliness and degree
of detail, there are certain data quality issues to
be addressed to ensure that the consolidated
banking data can be collected within a
consistent statistical framework. The ECB,
together with the BSC and the STC, aims at
promoting further improvements of the
statistics for banking stability, particularly
concerning the coherence of the definitions
of the basic prudential aggregates, the
application of consolidation methods, the
consistency of the reporting population and the
appropriate consistency with other data sets. In
particular, work is on-going in order to achieve
a minimum “common platform” consensus, to
be developed on the basis of concepts and
definitions stemming from EU Directives.78
As the BAD and other EC Directives are
important references for statistical balance
sheet information, an assessment needs to be
made of the degree of harmonisation with these
definitions at the national level. Another useful
reference for the collection of profitability data
is the Regulation on Structural Business
Statistics (see section 9). In the medium term,
certain improvements might derive from
international development efforts such as the
legal enforcement of International Accounting
Standards (IAS) in the EU accounting
legislation, which should improve aggregation
of consolidated banking data.79 However,
it is recognised that the establishment of
a harmonised macro-economic statistical
framework concerning consolidated banking
data will require a significant effort, both
conceptually and in terms of its
implementation. The overall strategy is to meet
immediate needs on the basis of the available
data and resources, but at the same time to
promote, in the medium to long-term, the
consistency across different data sets.
The following objectives are currently
pursued:
– The coherence of the definitions of the basic
prudential aggregates. In particular, the
76 According to this principle, a resident MFI means an MFI that
is resident in the economic territory of a given country.
77 Along these lines, see for instance IMF (November 2001).
78 Most definitions are contained in the Bank Accounts Directive
(86/635/EEC), the Capital Adequacy Directive 93/6/EEC),
Directive 2000/12/EC relating to the taking up and pursuit of
the business of credit institutions, the 2nd Banking Directive
89/646/EEC and the 7thCouncil Directive83/349/EEC.
79 Steps are being made to co-ordinate the IAS accounting
techniques regarding provisioning of loans with those
recommended by the Basel Committee.53
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9 Comparisons with
other initiatives development of a reporting framework for
consolidated banking data relies on the
layout and accounting definitions provided
by the Bank Accounts Directive (BAD) and
other EC Directives. These directives are
important references for statistical balance
sheet information. Moreover, work will
continue towards convergence in
definitions of some important variables
such as non-performing loans and off-
balance sheet items. In this respect, the
statistical community is discussing a
possible update of the relevant statistical
standards in order to ensure the macro-
financial statistics keep track of non-
performing loans.80, 81 While the ESCB
framework strives towards defining non-
performing loans as soon as loan payment
delays are equivalent to 90 days, work is on-
going in order to achieve a minimum
“common platform” consensus for the
medium term.
– The application of consolidation methods.
Work will continue to further ensure that
the implementation of consolidation
methods is uniform across countries. In
particular, the work should aim at a
consolidation on a cross-border basis
(country dimension) and across all the
sectors of the financial system (sector
dimension). Concerning the sector
dimension, the consolidation of the
business of insurance companies is
particularly challenging. The impact of any
deviation is being assessed and monitored.
– The consistency and homogeneity of the
reporting population. To ensure that
consistent data are available for
aggregation, it is important that the
reporting population is defined in the same
way in all countries. In addition, to avoid
data duplication, it is important to correctly
allocate the subsidiaries of foreign banks,
following the host country approach. A
consistency check will be conducted
regularly to ensure a link with the existing
MFI population.
– The establishment and maintenance of a
survey of national supervisory practice and
prospects. It is recognised that not all
requirements can be met. In particular,
those that have a marginal impact on the
data can remain just “recommendations”
rather than strict requirements. The work in
the context of the ESCB will continue also
to ensure that deviations from the
recommended practice are recorded and
monitored. This is important also because
financial innovation or regulatory changes
may suddenly require that “recommended”
data become requirements.
– The convergence with the IMF standards.
As explained below, it is important that the
development of MPIs for the euro area and
the EU and the standards recently
established by the IMF are closely aligned.
In this regard, for the EU the frequency of
reporting (on a quarterly basis rather than
annually) and the consolidation method (the
cross-sector dimension) are the main
challenges.
9 COMPARISONS WITH OTHER INITIATIVES
In this work, it is important to bear in mind
similar initiatives carried out by international
agencies, in particular the IMF, but also the
OECD, Eurostat, the BIS as well as market
analysts.
From the perspective of macro-prudential
indicators, the IMF work is probably the most
interesting because it aims for developing
international standards for the compilation of
financial soundness indicators, to which the
ECB is contributing. These standards may
80 The IMF has established an Electronic Discussion Group
(EDG) at the recommendation of the Intersecretariat Working
Group on National Accounts (ISWGNA). The purpose is to
work towards an acceptable treatment for nonperforming
loans in macroeconomic statistics (cf. www.imf.org/external/
np/sta/npl/eng/discuss/index.htm).
81 For proposals to compile data on non-performing loans within
the macroeconomic statistics framework, see Bloem and
Gorter (2001), Krueger (2002) and ECB (2004b).54
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represent a benchmark for the future. For this
reason, the IMF case is described in a separate
sub-section.
The work conducted in the OECD and Eurostat
is of interest for their attempts to collect
statistics on banks’ consolidated balance
sheets, profitability, assets quality and capital
adequacy. The experience of the BIS is
important due to its international banking
statistics, which are used to analyse the
international exposure of banks. From a
methodological point of view, it is interesting to
note that the BIS statistics face the same
problems (regarding consolidation, coverage
and consistency of the reporting population)
which are currently being addressed by the
ECB. The experiences of these international
organisations are reviewed in the next sub-
section.
9.1 IMF FINANCIAL SOUNDNESS INDICATORS
The work of the IMF to strengthen the financial
system includes the recommendation to
compile Financial Stability Indicators (FSIs)
as a tool to enhance crisis prevention. The work
originated with a survey conducted amongst
compilers and users of FSIs in mid-2000.82
Eventually, in June 2001 the IMF Executive
Board issued a press release with an endorsed
list of FSIs. Subsequently, the IMF developed a
Compilation Guide as the international
statistical standard for the definition and
calculation of the FSIs. A draft of this Guide
was released for public comments earlier this
year and has now been finalised.83
Resulting from this process, the IMF is
requesting some member countries to compile
and publish the FSIs. Reflecting differences in
priority and ease of calculation, a distinction is
made between a core and an encouraged set of
indicators. While the core indicators mainly
focus on generally available indicators relating
to banks, the encouraged set of indicators focus
more on the non-bank financial sector, the
corporate and household sectors, and real
estate markets. The IMF recommends that the
FSIs calculated as aggregated series should be
complemented by additional series that
measure dispersion, peer group analysis and
the results of stress tests.
The FSIs are already used in the Financial
Sector Assessment Program, in Article IV
consultation reports and in publications such as
the quarterly Global Financial Stability
Report. The IMF Executive Board also had
preliminary discussions on the possible
inclusion of these indicators in the Special
Data Dissemination Standards, most recently
in June 2003. The IMF Executive Board has
agreed on a project to develop an operational
database of FSIs within the IMF and to
conduct, with the assistance of other
international agencies, a co-ordinated
compilation exercise for supervisors and
statisticians after the finalisation of the
Guide.84
The IMF Compilation Guideline for FSIs
currently represents the international standard
for the definitions, concepts, data sources and
techniques used in the compilation of FSIs.
By recognising the data availability problems
as well as the different national supervisory
and accounting regimes and financial market
structures, the Guide is rather flexible in
permitting compilation of FSIs according
to different approaches. In the short-term,
availability of information is the primary
objective, while harmonisation is seen as a
longer-term objective. The Guide then
provides a “benchmark” against which to
measure progress towards full harmonisation.
Given the rather far-reaching nature of the
proposals, this is an ambitious objective.
82 In April 2000, the IMF also issued an Occasional Paper on
“Macroprudential indicators of financial system soundness”
(see Evans et al. 2000)), providing a conceptual background
on the uses and sources of these statistics. In particular,
chapter VI on “measurement issues” provides a clear overview
of the statistical problems related to FSIs. Most of these
problems have been discussed earlier in this paper.
83 After a meeting of experts to finalise the Guide in autumn
2003, the Guide has been published in summer 2004.
84 The IMF Board will review progress on FSIs after two years.55
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9 Comparisons with
other initiatives A rather new feature is the fact that the IMF
foresees not only the compilation of aggregated
indicators, but also various analyses making
greater use of individual institution data – peer
group and dispersion analysis. This implies a
need to ensure that harmonisation relates to the
level of individual reporting agents and
coverage reaches 100%. In addition, the Guide
makes recommendations not simply in respect
of the indicators, but also concerning the
statistical frameworks (financial statements)
within which these indicators should be
compiled for each economic sector.
9.1.1 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE ESCB AND
IMF APPROACHES
There are some key differences between the
ESCB and the IMF approaches. First of all, it is
important to recognise that the focus of the
Guide is on the compilation of FSIs at a
national level. The ESCB framework, however,
compiles indicators also at the European level
and the euro area level depending on which is
deemed most useful for the analysis.
The IMF core set of indicators for macro-
prudential analysis is less detailed than the
corresponding ESCB MPI set, which is
intended to provide a broad and timely picture
of issues affecting banking stability within the
EU.85 However, this is fully justified by the fact
that the FSIs of the IMF represent a minimum
global standard for an assessment of financial
stability.
In some respects, the IMF approach can be seen
as more ambitious than the ESCB approach. In
particular, in the EU context the planned
quarterly frequency for the full set of FSIs and
for complete national sectors will take some
time, given the current limited availability of
data at the moment.
One of the key conceptual differences between
the ESCB and the IMF approaches lies in the
consolidation method.86 In the Guide, the
consolidation is limited to domestically
controlled banks on a cross-border basis. The
ECB’s clear priority is on the consolidated data
of domestically controlled banks and other
financial intermediaries on a cross-border
basis, because this gives an indication of the
full income potential and financial condition of
the institutions concerned. In Europe, most
supervisory data also rely on this form of
consolidation. Omitting operations of group
entities that are not banks themselves would
lead to a very incomplete view.
9.1.2 DETAILED COMPARISON BETWEEN THE
ESCB AND IMF SETS OF INDICATORS
When comparing the two sets of indicators it
can be seen that the ESCB’s MPIs Indicators
match around two thirds of the IMF’s FSIs.
Furthermore, in respect of the core set of 12
FSIs with the larger ESCB set (see Exhibit 9
below), it appears that all these indicators
are broadly matched by equivalent ESCB
indicators. From these ESCB indicators, 5
make use of MBS data. Furthermore, as the
intended coverage of the ESCB exercise is the
EU area, where banks have a predominant role
in the financial system, the core set of IMF
indicators is almost fully covered in the ESCB
set.87
Concerning the IMF encouraged set of 26 FSIs
(see Exhibit 10 below), 15 of the encouraged
indicators are broadly matched by ESCB
indicators. Out of these 15 indicators, 5 of the
ESCB indicators are constructed using MBS
data and 3 indicators use financial accounts
85 More specifically, the ESCB analysis is deeper in certain
aspects, as it is structured to cover seven risk areas and
includes additional indicators (e.g. on other dimensions of
risk concentrations, on competitive conditions and on cyclical
and monetary conditions) that do not belong to the FSI
framework.
86 While traditional macroeconomic statistical approaches
follow an unconsolidated approach, the IMF is attempting to
bridge the accounting/supervisory approach with the
traditional statistical approach. For a proposal to reconcile the
two systems, see Laliberté (2004).
87 An advisory group of experts recommended the IMF to drop
two indicators from the list and to downgrade indicator 6 to the
encouraged set. Subject to endorsement by the IMF Executive
Board, the list of core indicators is then reduced from 15
indicators to 12. The three indicators dropped from the core
set relate to the duration of assets and liabilities (removed
altogether) and to large exposures to capital (added to the
encouraged set). None of these three indicators is presently
compiled by the ESCB.56
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data. The indicators not yet covered by the
ESCB MPIs relate to data on the corporate
sector, on OFIs and on banks’ exposure in
financial derivatives.
It should be noted that some of the FSIs
currently not compiled by the ESCB can be
calculated on the basis of available data.
Moreover, some of the ESCB indicators that
are broadly, but not exactly in line with the
corresponding FSIs can be fine-tuned to follow
more strictly the IMF guidelines. For instance,
the core FSI “Net open position in foreign
exchange to capital” is currently partly
matched by a macro-prudential indicator of the
ESCB list, the “share of lending in foreign
currency”. The ESCB ratio covers only loans,
not the overall net open position, as
recommended by the IMF. To calculate the FSI
in question, the net open position can be
derived from MBS data as most balance sheet
items (BSI) are broken down by currency. The
denominator “capital” is also separately
available in the current BSI data set.
The main involvement of the ECB in the IMF
work in the field of FSIs can be summarised as
follows. First, the ECB, together with a number
of other national and international agencies,
has provided assistance to the IMF in the
finalisation of the Compilation Guide. The
ECB shows full support to the IMF initiative as
compliance to the IMF standards would
enhance international comparability of FSIs
compiled in the EU and anticipate the possible
requirement for these statistics as part of the
SDDS framework. At the same time, however,
due consideration should be given to the
specific features of the European financial
system.
9.2 OTHER DATA PROVIDERS
There are only a few potential sources of data on
banks’ consolidated balance sheets, profitability,
assets quality and capital adequacy.
Among the potential sources is the OECD,
which publishes banks’ profitability data.
OECD statistics provide information on
N. Core Financial Soundness Indicators Match with ECB
1 Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets Yes
2 Regulatory Tier I capital to risk-weighted assets Yes
3 Non-performing loans to total gross loans Yes
4 Non-performing loans net of provisions to capital Yes
5 Sectoral distribution of loans to total loans Partly1)
6 Return on assets (net income to average total assets) Yes
7 Return on equity (net income to average equity) Yes2)
8 Interest margin to gross income Yes
9 Non-interest expenses to gross income Yes
10 Liquid assets to total assets (liquid asset ratio) Yes
11 Liquid assets to short-term liabilities Partly3)
12 Net open position in foreign exchange to capital Partly4)
1) The IMF recommends the sector breakdown into banks, government, other financial corporations, non-financial corporations,
households and NPISH, and non-residents. However, the ECB list of MPIs does not cover “loans to government”. Moreover, instead
of calculating the indicator “loans to banks”, the ECB compiles an indicator on the “share of interbank assets to total assets”.
2) The ECB compiles also indicators on the distribution of RoE.
3) Two ECB indicators (“Ratio of non-bank deposits to M2” and “Ratio of total loans to non-bank deposits”) provide an indication of
the liquidity risk in the banks’ balance sheets, but do not match exactly with the core IMF indicator.
4) The ECB ratio covers only loans, not the net open position, as recommended by the IMF. Moreover, the denominator is presently
not “capital”, but “total loans”.
Exhibit 9 Is the ESCB compiling the IMF Core Financial Soundness Indicators?57
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N. Encouraged Financial Soundness Indicators Match with the ESCB
Deposit-taking institutions
1 Capital to assets Yes
2 Large exposures to capital No
3 Geographical distribution of loans to total loans Partly1)
4 Gross asset position in financial derivatives to capital No
5 Gross liabilities position in financial derivatives to capital No
6 Trading and forex gains/losses to total income Yes
7 Personnel expenses to noninterest expenses No
8 Spread between reference lending and deposit rates Yes
9 Spread between highest and lowest interbank rate Yes
10 Customer deposits to total (non-interbank) loans Partly2)
11 FX-denominated loans to total loans Yes
12 FX-denominated liabilities to total liabilities No
13 Net open position in equities to capital No
Market liquidity
14 Average bid-ask spread in the securities market Yes
15 Average daily turnover ratio in the securities market No
Nonbank financial institutions
16 Assets to total financial system assets No
17 Assets to GDP No
Corporate sector
18 Total debt to equity Yes
19 ROE (earnings before interest & taxes to average equity) No
20 Earnings before interest & taxes to interest and principal expenses No
21 Net FX exposure to equity No
22 Number of applications for protection from creditors Yes
Households
23 Household debt to GDP Yes
24 Debt service and principal payments to income Yes
Real estate markets
25 Real estate prices Yes
26 Residential real estate loans to total loans Yes
27 Commercial real estate loans to total loans Yes
1) The geographical classification proposed by the IMF does not fully coincide with the ECB breakdown. For instance, the IMF does
request positions viz Latin America, which are covered by the ECB, while the latter does not identify positions viz Africa, which are
recommended by the IMF.
2) The ratio is inverted. Moreover, the numerator of the ECB ratio is gross of interbank loans.
Exhibit 10 Is the ESCB compiling the IMF Encouraged Financial Soundness Indicators?
financial statements of banks in all OECD
member countries. 88 Data are produced on an
annual basis, they are reported with a long,
irregular lag of 15-18 months, and they are
complemented by some balance sheet and
capital adequacy data. As admitted by the
OECD itself, these statistics are not
harmonised and country comparisons are
difficult due to differences in coverage,
accounting practices and reporting methods.
88 See OECD (2002). See also the standard framework for the
collection of statistics by country (www.oecd.org/dataoecd/
50/44/2373422.pdf).58
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As regards indicators complied by the BIS, it
publishes quarterly statistics on global
consolidated claims of banks in 24 major
reporting countries on selected individual
debtor countries. These data are relevant in
analysing the international bank indebtedness
towards developing countries and Eastern
European countries. They provide information
on counterparties of the individual national
banking systems the regarding country
exposures. The BIS publishes both the world-
wide aggregates of country risk exposures vis-
à-vis individual countries and data on the
exposures of most individual reporting banking
systems.
The BIS consolidated banking statistics cover
all claims on individual countries, which are
not part of the reporting area, i.e. which are not
one of the 18 OECD reporting countries. While
currently 24 major countries provide data on
country risk exposures, the world-wide
consolidation of individual banks’ balance
sheet claims means that in practice the claims
of a large number of banking offices located
outside the principal reporting area are also
covered. In addition to the full geographical
breakdown of claims, the BIS consolidated
data provide breakdowns by nationality of the
reporting banks and by residual maturity
distribution (up to an including one year / over
one year up to two years / over two years) and
sector distribution (banks / public sector / non-
bank private sector) of exposures.
The BIS consolidated banking data are
currently in the process of being considerably
enhanced with the aim to provide more detailed
and comprehensive data on country risk
exposures on an ultimate risk basis, i.e. on risk
positions reallocated to the country where the
final guarantor of a financial claim resides. The
enhanced statistics are scheduled to go live by
the end of 2004.89
The BIS case is interesting because it
integrates similar statistics following different
residency criteria. Within its International
Banking Statistics, the BIS compiles and
89 See BIS (2003).
90 In most cases the impact of the inclusion of non-financial
affiliates is probably insignificant.
publishes locational banking statistics
following the host country principle, whereas
its consolidated banking statistics follow
the home country principle. The reporting
population of the consolidated banking
statistics only cover banking institutions,
which broadly correspond to the EU definition
of credit institutions.
Regarding the principles of consolidation, the
BIS has not issued any guidelines on whether or
not the consolidated reporting should only
include affiliates that belong to the same
economic sector as that of the reporting
institutions. The practice of consolidation is
therefore left to national discretion. A recent
survey revealed that only in 5 of the 27
reporting countries reporting banks include
non-financial affiliates in their consolidated
banking data90. In addition, in 13 of the 27
reporting countries, and in two additional
countries in the future, reporting banks include
other non-bank financial affiliates in their
consolidated banking data although in most
cases the impact on the data is not significant
(with the notable exception of the US and
Canada).
The institutional coverage of consolidation
recommended by the IMF (see sub-section
above) comprises credit institutions only. This
implies that the IMF recommendation is
currently followed by 14 of the 27 countries
that participate in the BIS consolidated
banking statistics. The other 13 countries do
not follow this approach and two additional
countries have plans to deviate from the
proposed institutional coverage in the future
because consolidation rules in the BIS
consolidated banking statistics are left to
national discretion and follow differing
national practices.
Additional information on banks’ profitability
is collected by Eurostat in the context of the
Regulation concerning structural business59
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9 Comparisons with
other initiatives statistics.91 Although the data collection starts
with the reference year 2001, Eurostat has
collected, on a voluntary basis, back series
since 1997. These data are still not available
with the necessary frequency as Eurostat
collects these statistics on credit institutions on
an annual basis, with a delay of 10 months. In
addition, the degree of detail and timeliness are
not adequate for the purpose of the ECB macro-
prudential analysis.
Data on banks’ income and expenditure belong,
in principle, to the category of macro-financial
statistics. Indeed, the National Statistical
Institutes (NSIs) normally use these data to
calculate the banking sector contribution to
GDP and to the current account of the balance
of payments. However, these statistical data
are compiled on a host country basis (i.e. are
not consolidated) and are neither sufficiently
detailed nor timely enough to meet the
requirements for macro-prudential analysis.
Finally, commercial data providers and rating
agencies also compile and publish their own
variables for many of the indicators considered
in the analysis of banking sector health. In
doing so they follow many different
compilation methods, which can give rise to
different values for the same variable. For
instance, the profitability indicators compiled
using financial statements data are not always
comparable. Taking the example of the RoE, it
can be seen how the use of different
methodologies to calculate ratios gives rise to
different results. For example, RoE published
by market sources may describe profitability
before or after taxes, extraordinary items, or
the capital used in the denominator may be
defined differently. This can be seen from often
different profitability ratios for the same bank
published in different sources.92 These
examples show that there is a need to specify
clearly the different methodologies used.
Certainly, there is no single way of defining
RoE and other key indicators. Provided that
data sources are complemented with sufficient
metadata on the definitions used, the analysis
can benefit from the necessary flexibility.
91 Regulation (EC) No 2056/2002 of 5 November 2002 amending
Regulation (EC, Euratom) n. 58/97.
92 The same issue of possibly different definitions can also occur
in official data sources. For instance, the ECB report on the
EU banking sector stability shows that the RoE of EU banks in
the year 2000 was 12.44% (see ECB, 2003a). The value of the
same variable is 10.9% according to Eurostat (see Eurostat,
2002). While Eurostat uses a pure accounting concept of
“capital & reserves” (which includes subordinated debt), the
ECB uses the prudential supervision concept of “Tier 1”
capital, which is the sum of capital and reserves excluding
subordinated debt, less standard deductions (own shares and
immaterial assets).60
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